North Korea's tactical nuclear weapons and the need to amend ROK-US nuclear cooperation

By Choo Jae-woo

On March 19, a news report alleging North Korea's tactical nuclear weapons test caught nuclear pundits around the world off guard. It was particularly shocking for its strategic implications from two perspectives. One, is the completion of North Korea's tactical nuclear weapons system, if, in fact, it is factually true. The other is the South's apparent increased vulnerabilities to the North's tactical attacks due to nuclear warheads or biochemical canisters. The South's vulnerabilities are obvious to all by the fact its standing defense system and deterrence capabilities are not designed to counter such attacks from the North.

If North Korea is, as alleged, capable of launching tactical short-range ballistic nuclear missiles from silos, coupled with a complete and perfected command-and-control system, it will push the South Korean people's desire for their own nuclear weapons to another level. Already a drastic rise in public support for having our own nuclear weapons was demonstrated by two different survey results. A Jan. 31 survey by Korea Gallup showed that 77 percent of respondents were in favor of nuclear weapons, an increase of nearly 10 percentage points from the Jan. 1 survey conducted by Hankook Research.

In the meantime, the Korean government has taken two different approaches to North Korean nuclear threats. One is to consolidate the U.S.' commitment to extended nuclear deterrence. The other is to amend the Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation of 2015. In the latter scenario, South Korea would seek a provision allowing it to reprocess its spent nuclear fuel and the enrichment of uranium. The Agreement still abides by the requirement of the Atomic Energy Act (as amended), and stipulates that with U.S. permission, Korea can reprocess U.S.-original spent fuel as well as spent fuel from South Korea's U.S.-designed reactors.

It is apparent that the United States and Korea have been in close consultation on the question of the U.S. guarantee of nuclear security to its ally. Since South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol's inauguration last May, one of the issues he immediately went after was to verify and confirm the U.S.' commitment to extended nuclear deterrence. Korea's new president felt the need to clarify this for one clear reason: The nuclear deterrence strategy that the two countries had agreed on, also known as the Tailed Deterrence strategy, was in 2013.

The strategy now seems outdated against the North's pre-emptive nuclear strikes that can come from mobile launchers, silos, submarines and others alike. An updated version of the strategy has been under discussion by the two allies since last fall. While they are working to further improve the information-sharing system, a new point is proactively also being sought. It is about designing a set of responses befitting to various nuclear crisis contingencies per launcher type (e.g. silos, mobile and submarines) and nuclear warheads (e.g. tactical, strategic and hydrogen). For this reason, the Korean government opposes the public demand for nuclearization.

Nevertheless, the government's persistent demand for an amendment to the existing civilian nuclear cooperation agreement already sounds controversial. While the Korean government officially rejects the idea of becoming a nuclear weapons state, the implications of a revision speak otherwise. It calls for granting Korea the right to reprocess spent fuel and enrich uranium. It is based on the fact that Korea is fast running short of storage for its ever-growing nuclear waste.

Washington is well aware of the situation but still reluctant to do something about it for two political reasons. The U.S. is concerned about going against its nonproliferation policies should it grant fuel-making technologies to Korea, not to mention nuclear materials for fuel or nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Washington has contended the latter's possible negative impact on denuclearization talks with Pyongyang.

From the Korean perspective, the only way to meet the challenges from the aforementioned three domains is by Korea having reprocessing and enrichment facilities. As an act of deterrence, these facilities will place Korea in the middle phase of nuclear weapons building capacity. It will somewhat satiate the Korean public's appetite for nuclear weapons and alleviate their fear of the North's growing nuclear threat. Along with extended nuclear deterrence in place, it could work towards our own advantage as it may somewhat offset the advantages the North feels that it has in its self-proclaimed nuclear power status at denuclearization talks.

The Korean government's concerns about growing stockpiles of spent nuclear fuel outpacing storage space will be drastically resolved. Had Korea had small nuclear power programs with less than 10 reactors, Korea's argument for reprocessing or enrichment would have been financially unworthy and not justifiable. However, it is a country with 24 reactors and is the fifth largest user of nuclear power globally. Korea plans to build more nuclear plants but no storage facilities. At the current production rate of nuclear waste, it will reach its storage capacity limit starting in 2031.

The ROK-U.S. alliance must confront the challenges stemming from the nuclear waste-associated problems. Reprocessing and enrichment facilities should come under the supervision of ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, replacing the existing civilian-led High-Level Bilateral Commission. The Command can keep enriched uranium from military use. The U.S. Forces in Korea must secure a stable supply of electricity for its sophisticated weapons systems.

An enrichment program can fortify the U.S.' extended nuclear deterrence programs with weapons-grade uranium readily available in Korea. The reality is that the U.S. can afford only 100 tactical nuclear weapons for regions other than Europe. It is an insufficient amount to counter North Korea's tactical nuclear attacks alone. It will be a memorable 70th anniversary of the ROK-U.S. alliance should they be materialized.

Choo Jae-woo (jwc@khu.ac.kr) is a professor of international relations at Kyung Hee University and director of the China Center at the Korea Research Institute for National Security. He was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution.