No shortcuts on road to reunification

By Park Jung-won

"Reunification can happen suddenly, so only when we are prepared can we realize it," South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol said while attending a policy briefing from the unification ministry on Jan. 27. His remarks caused a big stir for suggesting the possibility of the imminent collapse of the current North Korean regime. In fact, it is not unusual to hear presidents from a conservative party say that unification can occur like lightning.

Former President Lee Myung-bak said in June 2011, "Unification might come in the dead of night like a thief." Former President Park Geun-hye in January 2014 used the direct expression that "unification is a jackpot." It is highly irresponsible for such political leaders to say that unification can come suddenly, like winning the lottery, because it can mislead the general public. Such a rapid reunion of the two Koreas is not possible, either logistically or legally.

In order to even imagine reunification happening, one must first presuppose that the North's regime, led by Kim Jong-un, will collapse. The possible scenarios in which the regime collapses could be external military aggression, total economic breakdown, the sudden death of Kim or a massive anti-regime uprising by the North Korean people. But all of these are currently unlikely.

In the past, the U.S. has reviewed scenarios for a preemptive attack on North Korea, such as a surgical operation on its nuclear facilities or a "decapitation strike" on its leader. However, it is hard to imagine such a U.S. attack on North Korea now, at a time when President Joe Biden opposes unilateral changes to the status quo and is wary of an increasingly powerful China. North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons capable of reaching the U.S. mainland also makes such risky operations virtually inconceivable.

It is reported that the current economic situation in North Korea is precarious, but the collapse of the regime due solely to economic problems is not possible. A society as tightly controlled as North Korea's is unlikely to collapse easily. And there is little chance that Kim Jong-un, who is only 39, will die suddenly. Rather, a domino effect involving the confluence of many unpredictable events, like what happened in Europe when the Eastern Bloc imploded in the early 1990s, could create the greatest chance for the downfall of the North's political regime. Internal instability in China, North Korea's blood ally, for instance, would certainly make the regime's hold on power less assured. But economic difficulties alone are unlikely to cause it to collapse.

Even if Kim's regime were to collapse, it would not automatically mean the reunification of the two Koreas. New power groups, such as remnants of the North's armed forces, could emerge, and even if there were a destabilizing internal power struggle, South Korea's ability to intervene militarily would be limited. Could South Korean troops enter North Korea and clean up the anarchy? North Korea is a member of the United Nations and enjoys statehood recognized by the international community.

Aside from the fact that the South Korean Constitution binds it to pursuing reunification peacefully, if it were to occupy North Korea by force, it would be a clear violation of international law. It might be possible to make a claim that North Korean territory belongs to the South with reference to South Korea's constitutional territoriality clause, but it would be difficult to garner international support for this claim. In addition, China, which has a military alliance treaty with North Korea, might actively intervene in such an emergency to protect its interests. South Korea would be unable to counter such a great power on its own.

More fundamentally, the reunification of the Korean Peninsula will be possible only when the will of the North Korean people (through the right to self-determination under international law) establishes its desire for unification with the South. If they do not want to reunify with South Korea, the South's desire to do so will be irrelevant. Furthermore, South Korea's constitution pursues liberal democracy and a market economy. If the North Korean people want unification only under a communist or socialist regime, this is a formula that South Korea cannot accept.

Thus if South Korea truly desires reunification, it must take a long-term approach to win the support of the North Korean people, so that they will genuinely welcome a unification process with the South that entails an eventual alignment of their political and economic systems.

In South Korea's politics of inter-Korean relations, policies have fluctuated according to "camp logic" with each transition of party power. Inter-Korean relations have only served as a political tool for each party's domestic political interests rather than towards any true pursuit of reunification.

The conservative side says that if Kim's regime collapses, South Korea's free, democratic system will quickly absorb and reunify with North Korea, whereas the progressive side says that a permanent peace will be established on the Korean Peninsula if Kim's regime security is guaranteed by the U.S., ignoring the fact that the North's nuclear weapons target South Korea. Neither side's narrative is rooted in reality.

If South Korea is truly a liberal democracy, it is more important to secure consistency in improving human rights in North Korea regardless of conservative and liberal party interests, instead of calling for an impossibly swift unification. Reunification cannot be achieved suddenly, and should not be pursued abruptly.

Park Jung-won (park_jungwon@hotmail.com), Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics (LSE), is a professor of international law at Dankook University.