Anti-China alliance deepens with new deal

By Andrew Hammond

On Jan. 6 Japan and Australia signed a new security defense deal highlighting how Tokyo is of growing strategic importance as a partner in the emerging anti-China alliance.

The Reciprocal Access Agreement, which eases restrictions on the movement of weapons and supplies for joint training and disaster relief operations, is only the latest security pact aimed at countering China's military adventurism. The agreement, signed by Prime Ministers Fumio Kishida and Scott Morrison, is "a landmark instrument which will elevate security cooperation between the nations to new heights," the new Japanese leader said.

The deal, coming after last year's 75th anniversary of Victory over Japan (VJ Day) that brought closure to World War II, underlines how Tokyo's importance in the alliance is of key importance again. Not only is Japan a longstanding member of Western-dominated clubs such as the G7, plus the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). There is also growing policy speculation that it could be invited to join the so-called '5 Eyes' intelligence alliance.

A key part of the rationale for Japan's growing geopolitical importance is that, just like the start of the Cold War, it is perceived in the West as a key bulwark against the advance of China and potentially Russia into the Asia-Pacific region. Yet, while much emphasis is put on the security pillar of the Japanese-Western alliance, economics is important too.

Since the end of the World War II, the transformation of Japan's world role stemmed, in part, from its phenomenal post-war business success which led to growing calls for it to match its economic power with commitment to international political relations too. Today, it remains one of the world's largest three economies, and it will be critical to helping rejuvenate global growth after the shock of the coronavirus crisis.

Outside of the United States, many other Western countries, including in Europe, particularly welcome Japan's invigorated commitment to international trade. Not only did Tokyo sign last year a bilateral agreement with Washington, but it has committed recently too to an EU-Japan trade agreement covering around a third of global GDP and almost 650 million people.

Moreover, Tokyo was at the vanguard of the so-called Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which accounts for around 13 percent of global trade and a combined population of around 500 million.

Beyond these structural factors driving Japan's international policy, the previous Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe ― the longest serving premier in the nation's history ― proved personally very adept at consolidating relationships with some Western leaders. Those included Donald Trump, who during the 2016 election campaign had been very critical of Tokyo.

Abe was one of the few foreign leaders, for instance, to secure a trade deal with Trump. This deal helped neutralize Trump's previous criticism of what he characterized as Japan's unfair trade practices involving car imports and exports; and his accusations that Tokyo was using monetary policy to devalue its currency to boost exports.

Moreover, Trump during his presidency repeatedly highlighted the strong U.S. commitment to the security of Japan and said that the relationship is the "cornerstone of peace" in Asia-Pacific. Trump made these comments despite his 2016 assertions that the bilateral relationship had become too one-sided, with Japan needing to undertake more financial burden-sharing in international security.

Undoubtedly, the major driver in the increasing closeness of U.S.-Japan ties is China. Here, Tokyo has been reassured by Washington following earlier worries after the U.S. withdrawal from the Comprehensive and Progressive TransPacific Partnership, which had been originally intended by the Obama administration to lock the United States into deeper strategic partnerships in the region.

In this fluid geopolitical landscape, Abe sought to increase Japan's defense spending significantly, and overturn some of the remaining legal and political underpinnings of the country's post-1945 pacifist identity so that it could become more externally engaged. One big, specific measure Abe pushed for was the abolition of Article Nine ― the clause in Japan's post-war constitution that constrains the country's military to a strictly defensive role rather than enabling a conventional army, and has meant that defense spending has remained below 1 percent of GDP for much of the period since 1945.

However, the two-thirds majority needed in both chambers of the Japanese legislature, and a simple majority in a national referendum, proved insuperable obstacles even for the long-standing prime minister. There remains a large body of Japanese public opinion which continues to value its post-war pacifism as the only country in the world to have ever been attacked with nuclear weapons, and this factor continues to be a check on Japan's foreign policy in the 2020s.

Andrew Hammond (andrewkorea@outlook.com) is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.