Korean civilization: Birth and death

Courtesy of Godino

By David A. Tizzard

You can't read about the development of Korea without coming across the names of Park Chung-hee, Chung Ju-yung and Lee Byung-chull. For better and for worse, these three men have imprinted their personalities on the country, at times bending it to their will. They were forces of nature: unique, irreplaceable and capable of creation and destruction in seemingly equal measure. Park was the youngest of seven brothers and sisters. Lee was the youngest of four. Conversely, Chung was the eldest of seven.

Family sizes were much bigger in the past for a variety of reasons that have been well-documented. As recently as the 1970s and 1980s, however, the Korean government embarked on promotions and programs to encourage citizens to have fewer children in order to maintain economic growth and better control demographics among the growing population.

Fast-forward a few decades and Korea now has the lowest birthrate in the world, and it's shrinking. While a trip to the mall won't necessarily prove it, looking at the actual data, hardly anyone is having children and this reality will have serious implications further down the line.

Countless reasons are given for the country's incredibly low birthrate: exorbitant housing prices, a highly competitive and unforgiving social atmosphere that pushes many citizens to a suicidal breaking point, a patriarchal system that has yet to grant economic and social equality to women, or people choosing themselves and their careers over starting families.

For the first time since the advent of the capitalist system, nations around the world are dealing with birthrates that will fail to replace the current population. In Korea last year, deaths outnumbered births for the first time. This fact has capitalists worried. While there is genuine talk about innovation and creativity as economic drivers, capitalism has often required population growth to drive it forward. This situation was never more evident than in Korea during the 1960s and 1970s.

Many books refer to the country's industrialization as "the miracle on the Han River." What that attribution to magic or miracles failed to account for, however, is that the economic growth was in large part achieved by both population growth and increasing the number of workers, particularly women. The "miracle" was often based on tens of thousands of young women from the countryside working in sweatshop-like conditions for meager pay. It doesn't have quite as catchy a ring to it though, does it?

In order to combat falling birthrates, a variety of strategies have been adopted by other capitalist systems, among these: Foucauldian biopower, social welfare and immigration. The first relates to the restriction of women's control over the reproductive process as well as the promotion of traditional family structures. Despite a majority in the National Assembly, the ruling Democratic Party demonstrated itself to be in no rush to legalize abortion, despite being instructed by the Constitutional Court to do so. It has also largely ignored the question of legitimizing non-heterosexual relationships despite loud and frequent claims from those inside and outside of the country.

The second strategy is a monetary approach. Previously, a family could quite easily survive ― even prosper ― if only one of the parents (usually the father) worked a full-time job. That's a pipe dream for many these days. Both parents are often forced into employment to even attempt to meet the rising costs of living. Governments then offer financial incentives to people to have children: these are normally, though not exclusively, aimed at the working class.

Consider the current deal: the Korean government rewards childbirth with a cash payment of 2 million won and then 300,000 won every month for one year. A whole host of other financial incentives related to taxes, housing, childcare and banking are also available to heterosexual married couples who have biological children. These seemed the correct and noble thing to do to support young families until I was offered a different perspective.

Dr Lee Kyung-eun suggested to me that it is a violation of human rights to offer financial rewards for people to have children. After all, how much is a human life really worth and who are we to place such a monetary value on it?

Having spent close to $2 trillion in the past decade in a host of failed efforts to address the world's lowest birthrate, Jake Kwon of CNN recently implored the Korean government to have "an honest conversation with its people". I certainly don't have any answers to the problem, but I think Jake is right about the necessity of that honest conversation. If such a conversation is to take place, I suggest that the following talking points be considered.

First, let us not see the falling birthrate as a problem. Let us see the situation as individuals making their own choices. If people are deciding they don't want to have children and instead pursue other life-fulfilling experiences, then more power to them.

Second, doesn't the falling birthrate suggest a problem not with our reproductive capabilities but rather with the economic system we inhabit? Rather than address our genitals, we should address why two parents working full-time will often struggle financially to raise one or two children, when a few decades ago, things were much easier. It might be that the economic system has changed more than people's actual reproductive drives.

Furthermore, this is not a call for a Great Leap Forward or some kind of communist tragedy of development that sacrifices millions. Surely the nation has far smarter sociologists and economists working on such problems than to look back to the 1920s for inspiration.

Third ― and the reason for starting this piece the way I did ― will fewer children result in cultural changes at the societal level? The effects of birth order on personality, psychological temperament, risk aversion and sexual orientation are by no means certain or set in stone. They may even be non-existent. However, the peer-reviewed academic literature is conducting such studies with interesting results, related to risk-taking, conscientiousness, athletic performance and sexual proclivities.

Perhaps more than just discussing the low birthrate as Jake suggested, it's more important for the Korean government and the people to discuss what kind of world they want to create and what kind of people they want to inhabit it. That, after all, is the fundamental question that lies underneath this all. Too often it gets lost in discussions about numbers, statistics and money. Before the metaverse swallows us in its digital embrace for a monthly fee, let's remember what it means to be all too human.

Dr. David A. Tizzard (datizzard@swu.ac.kr) has a Ph.D. in Korean Studies. He is a social/cultural commentator and musician who has lived in Korea for nearly two decades. He is also the host of the Korea Deconstructed podcast, which can be found online. The views expressed in the article are the author's own and do not reflect the editorial direction of The Korea Times.