[VIEW] What matters more than Harris' mustache

By Hwang Jae-ho

Hwang Jae-ho

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper jointly contributed to the Wall Street Journal on January 16 under the title "South Korea is an ally, not a dependent."

The gist of the article, just a day after the Jan. 6 talk on the 11th "Special Measures Agreement," was that "South Korea is an equal partner for peace on the Korean Peninsula and a wealthy South Korea should contribute more to its national defense."

Harry Harris, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea, also said in a meeting on Jan. 16 that South Korea should discuss with the U.S. in advance to avoid any misunderstanding that Seoul is breaking the sanctions against Pyongyang. The high-ranking officials of the U.S. have put omnidirectional tackles on South Korea's defense burden and its policy toward North Korea. Will we ever be able to pay less and push further?

Harris mentioning the possibility of sanctions in case of Moon Jae-in's inter-Korean cooperation has been interpreted as "interference in sovereignty." Whether he grows a mustache or he has roots from Japan is no more than simple gossip. He is only carrying out the values of President Donald Trump. Or has he let us know exactly what Trump and the U.S. are thinking?

Both Pompeo and Esper are also just people who share the same ideas with Trump or execute his ideas. Therefore, they are the vanguards of their national interest and nothing can be changed even if we criticize them. They are one team. The article's reference to the U.S.'s contribution to the defense of South Korea, including its strategic assets, means not only the physical side but also the royalty of intangible "security" intellectual property rights. Trump told Fox News on Jan. 10 that South Korea will "pay more."

What South Korea should do as an ally that the U.S. wants is described in the contributed article. "South Korea's taking on a greater share of the load will ensure the alliance remains the linchpin of peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, in Northeast Asia ― and across the world." That is, Korea should pay more. Trump is already taking Korea's purchase of high-tech weapons for granted. He is adding the defense cost sharing and sending troops to the Hormuz Strait in his calculation.

Meanwhile, what South Korea wants the U.S. to do as an ally is to guarantee Korea's efforts to promote peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, in Northeast Asia and around the world. It also seeks partially to allow inter-Korean cooperation within the framework of the international sanctions on denuclearization.

The issue in Pompeo and Esper's article can be handled if we pay more, but what really matters is the remarks of Ambassador Harris. From South Korea's point of view, it is best if inter-Korean cooperation is possible with a smaller share of the cost, though it is not known whether the connection with the North will be made. It's all right if we can pay more if we can still have the connection.

We can come up with several scenarios in the Korea-U.S. relationship after the talk on Jan. 16. First, the case where the U.S. does not allow inter-Korean cooperation even though South Korea has paid more. This is a highly realistic option. Second, South Korea not paying more and the U.S. not allowing inter-Korean cooperation. However, this case is very close to impossible since Korea has no other way but to pay. Third, South Korea pays more and the U.S. allows inter-Korea cooperation. This is only possible only when Trump can persuade his opposites.

What is worrisome is that the defense-share cost and policies toward North Korea are two different issues to the U.S. Will we be able to get our message across to the U.S. when our position differs from that of the U.S.?

The U.S. did not head to an all-out war despite the removal of the Iranian commander because it was concerned about Iran's ability to retaliate. The trade truce with China is also due to China's economic power that could affect Trump's supporters. That's why he compromised. South Korea is also an ally of the U.S., but is there a "punch" for Trump to allow inter-Korean cooperation? Does Korea have cards that can be used as leverage for the U.S.? If the U.S. does not allow inter-Korean cooperation, will we compromise with second best?

Since President Moon has witnessed the U.S.'s influence under President Roh Moo-hyun's administration, as soon as he came to power, he regarded discussions with the U.S. as treating "a glass marble." However, this time we must cross the threshold, to raise the seed that has only sprouted over the past two years. We are looking forward to seeing both Korea and the U.S. compromise at a certain level. But if not, they will have to endure, which must be beyond the GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement). We are standing in 多魔好事 (little success in the road of difficulties), not in 好事多魔 (some setbacks in the road to success). Chances can be found in the crisis.

Hwang Jae-ho is director of the Global Security Cooperation Center, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, as well as a Canadian Global Affairs Institute fellow.