By You Ji
In recent years, Chinese leader Xi Jinping coined the widely used phrase "the fundamental change in world politics of the century" to portray China's deteriorating external environment. Without giving a specific definition of what the change is, the general understanding is that it refers to worsening Sino-U.S. relations in the advent of Washington finally coming up with a strategic depiction of China as its peer adversary.
The worsening of Sino-US relations
As a result, the White House has undergone a substantial break in its past China policy of conditional engagement. Increasingly, America is adopting a containment-oriented approach toward China's rise in the process of power transition.
Interestingly, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence denied in his October speech at the Wilson Centre that Washington has opted for a new containment strategy against China. To many international analysts, however, the U.S. containment can be construed as both a selective one, reflected by the decoupling effects of the ongoing Sino-U.S. trade war, and as a targeted one, reflected by U.S. military action to push back Chinese moves in the South China Sea. China is now probably under the heaviest international pressure since its opening to the outside world.
Beijing has adopted effective countermeasures to cope with the U.S. offensive, effective in a sense that it has reaped visible gains at its periphery. Among them, the most prominent foreign policy achievement for Beijing is the calming of the Korean crisis with several summit meetings among four players, Seoul, Pyongyang, Washington and Beijing. Although all have gained in one way or another in the rapprochement, Beijing has at least somewhat relieved an imminent crisis that former Chinese President Hu Jintao once described as more serious than Taiwan's challenge.
Xi Jinping's success in changing the course of development of the DPRK
President Xi should be congratulated for his great efforts in changing Kim Jong-un's basic stance on several key issues inside the DPRK and toward international security. To be more specific, three are worth mentioning.
The first is about convincing Kim that a nuclear option is not ideal for guaranteeing the DPRK's survival, as Pyongyang used to believe. This paved the way for Kim to reach a final decision to denuclearize, to the relief of all on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.
Secondly, in association with the first, Xi has successfully persuaded Kim that economic development is the most effective means of regime survival in general, and for Kim to consolidate legitimacy to rule in particular.
Thirdly, Xi assured Kim that it is possible for Pyongyang to improve relations with Washington, its long-cherished foreign policy dream, and with Seoul once denuclearization is initiated, starting from freezing nuclear and long-range missile tests.
The beginning of the DPRK's denuclearization has proved the value of Xi's peninsula policy that differed from his predecessor's. Simply put, Xi reordered China's priorities in pursuing crisis management on the Koran Peninsula, from targeting stability as the top policy goal, followed by denuclearization, to one that reversed this order.
Xi rightly concluded that without denuclearization there is no stability to talk about. To achieve this end, Xi maximized pressure on Pyongyang to yield to international pressure through a sanctions regime. Here he again changed the way sanctions were conducted by his predecessor, which was largely symbolic. Instead, Xi imposed substantial sanctions that not only hurt North Korea's economy but more critically its military readiness ― for example, through greatly reducing oil exports, including aviation fuel. Xi risked a complete breakdown of the relationship and creating a deadly enemy on its northern border. But he eventually won the gamble, as Kim blinked.
However, Xi's success in changing the North Korea's course is not cost-free. Beijing's resumption of a large amount of aid to an unpredictable government may not bear fruit if Kim eventually reneges on denuclearization, which is possible due to other factors beyond his control, such as continued U.S. hostility or a change of government in Seoul.
Today, China has to shoulder more responsibility for guaranteeing North Korea's security in the absence of a U.S. assurance in this regard. Four bilateral summit meetings in less than a year were really abnormal for two countries just recovering from the worst shape in their bilateral relationship. It may not be wise that Beijing has so quickly discarded its earlier depiction of North Korea as a normal neighbor, not a traditional ally. A Kim Jong-un trap is always possible for Beijing to handle, given that denuclearization is on pause today, and may be delayed for a long time. Then a success may turn into a nightmare.
Improving relations with other countries in the neighborhood
In the past few years, Beijing also has consolidated its regional standing in regard to the U.S., taking advantage of America's unilateralism that alienated its allies and partners through trade tariffs, its unreasonable demands for more payment for U.S. soldiers deployed in the allied countries and poisoned personal ties with regional leaders.
First, China has improved relations with Japan, realizing a state visit by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2018. Xi's state visit to Japan in April 2020 has been set with a return tour by Japan's Emperor in the planning. Such a frequency of summit visits is in sharp contrast to the fact the two countries had not had any state visits for almost seven years. In a way, the improvement has come relatively easily, as Xi decided to lower the tension caused by the Daiyus/Senkakus dispute and moved bilateral relations forward, diluting the negativity of an unpleasant history.
Secondly, China has improved relations with India. The Sino-Indian Doklam confrontation in 2017 almost got the two countries into a sizeable war. Both then realized that the relationship got them nowhere in the current complicated world politics. In 2018 and this year, two summit meetings were successfully conducted between Xi and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Wuhan and Chennai. Through a heart-to-heart exchange of views, they finally set agreements on the do's and don'ts, stabilizing bilateral ties to the benefit of both.
Finally, Beijing has successfully moved to improve relations with ASEAN. What Beijing has done is also simple: to end a cycle of assertiveness over the disputes in the South China Sea, which is relatively calm among the disputants, although tension remains high between the Chinese and American navies there. Yet the latter is not about territorial disputes any more but over geo-strategic rivalry. Today, Sino-ASEAN interaction is mostly positive, to Beijing's relief. A stable relationship with ASEAN ensures stability in China's backyard and allows Beijing to concentrate on U.S. pressure.
Yet there is a big question mark over China's overall standing in the "change of a century in world politics." Probably the accumulated positive effects of China improving ties with its immediate neighbors cannot offset the negative impact of worsening Sino-U.S. relations. China's external environment will remain precarious as long as its relations with Washington do not improve.
Dr. You Ji is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau.
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| You Ji |
The worsening of Sino-US relations
As a result, the White House has undergone a substantial break in its past China policy of conditional engagement. Increasingly, America is adopting a containment-oriented approach toward China's rise in the process of power transition.
Interestingly, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence denied in his October speech at the Wilson Centre that Washington has opted for a new containment strategy against China. To many international analysts, however, the U.S. containment can be construed as both a selective one, reflected by the decoupling effects of the ongoing Sino-U.S. trade war, and as a targeted one, reflected by U.S. military action to push back Chinese moves in the South China Sea. China is now probably under the heaviest international pressure since its opening to the outside world.
Beijing has adopted effective countermeasures to cope with the U.S. offensive, effective in a sense that it has reaped visible gains at its periphery. Among them, the most prominent foreign policy achievement for Beijing is the calming of the Korean crisis with several summit meetings among four players, Seoul, Pyongyang, Washington and Beijing. Although all have gained in one way or another in the rapprochement, Beijing has at least somewhat relieved an imminent crisis that former Chinese President Hu Jintao once described as more serious than Taiwan's challenge.
Xi Jinping's success in changing the course of development of the DPRK
President Xi should be congratulated for his great efforts in changing Kim Jong-un's basic stance on several key issues inside the DPRK and toward international security. To be more specific, three are worth mentioning.
The first is about convincing Kim that a nuclear option is not ideal for guaranteeing the DPRK's survival, as Pyongyang used to believe. This paved the way for Kim to reach a final decision to denuclearize, to the relief of all on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.
Secondly, in association with the first, Xi has successfully persuaded Kim that economic development is the most effective means of regime survival in general, and for Kim to consolidate legitimacy to rule in particular.
Thirdly, Xi assured Kim that it is possible for Pyongyang to improve relations with Washington, its long-cherished foreign policy dream, and with Seoul once denuclearization is initiated, starting from freezing nuclear and long-range missile tests.
The beginning of the DPRK's denuclearization has proved the value of Xi's peninsula policy that differed from his predecessor's. Simply put, Xi reordered China's priorities in pursuing crisis management on the Koran Peninsula, from targeting stability as the top policy goal, followed by denuclearization, to one that reversed this order.
Xi rightly concluded that without denuclearization there is no stability to talk about. To achieve this end, Xi maximized pressure on Pyongyang to yield to international pressure through a sanctions regime. Here he again changed the way sanctions were conducted by his predecessor, which was largely symbolic. Instead, Xi imposed substantial sanctions that not only hurt North Korea's economy but more critically its military readiness ― for example, through greatly reducing oil exports, including aviation fuel. Xi risked a complete breakdown of the relationship and creating a deadly enemy on its northern border. But he eventually won the gamble, as Kim blinked.
However, Xi's success in changing the North Korea's course is not cost-free. Beijing's resumption of a large amount of aid to an unpredictable government may not bear fruit if Kim eventually reneges on denuclearization, which is possible due to other factors beyond his control, such as continued U.S. hostility or a change of government in Seoul.
Today, China has to shoulder more responsibility for guaranteeing North Korea's security in the absence of a U.S. assurance in this regard. Four bilateral summit meetings in less than a year were really abnormal for two countries just recovering from the worst shape in their bilateral relationship. It may not be wise that Beijing has so quickly discarded its earlier depiction of North Korea as a normal neighbor, not a traditional ally. A Kim Jong-un trap is always possible for Beijing to handle, given that denuclearization is on pause today, and may be delayed for a long time. Then a success may turn into a nightmare.
Improving relations with other countries in the neighborhood
In the past few years, Beijing also has consolidated its regional standing in regard to the U.S., taking advantage of America's unilateralism that alienated its allies and partners through trade tariffs, its unreasonable demands for more payment for U.S. soldiers deployed in the allied countries and poisoned personal ties with regional leaders.
First, China has improved relations with Japan, realizing a state visit by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2018. Xi's state visit to Japan in April 2020 has been set with a return tour by Japan's Emperor in the planning. Such a frequency of summit visits is in sharp contrast to the fact the two countries had not had any state visits for almost seven years. In a way, the improvement has come relatively easily, as Xi decided to lower the tension caused by the Daiyus/Senkakus dispute and moved bilateral relations forward, diluting the negativity of an unpleasant history.
Secondly, China has improved relations with India. The Sino-Indian Doklam confrontation in 2017 almost got the two countries into a sizeable war. Both then realized that the relationship got them nowhere in the current complicated world politics. In 2018 and this year, two summit meetings were successfully conducted between Xi and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Wuhan and Chennai. Through a heart-to-heart exchange of views, they finally set agreements on the do's and don'ts, stabilizing bilateral ties to the benefit of both.
Finally, Beijing has successfully moved to improve relations with ASEAN. What Beijing has done is also simple: to end a cycle of assertiveness over the disputes in the South China Sea, which is relatively calm among the disputants, although tension remains high between the Chinese and American navies there. Yet the latter is not about territorial disputes any more but over geo-strategic rivalry. Today, Sino-ASEAN interaction is mostly positive, to Beijing's relief. A stable relationship with ASEAN ensures stability in China's backyard and allows Beijing to concentrate on U.S. pressure.
Yet there is a big question mark over China's overall standing in the "change of a century in world politics." Probably the accumulated positive effects of China improving ties with its immediate neighbors cannot offset the negative impact of worsening Sino-U.S. relations. China's external environment will remain precarious as long as its relations with Washington do not improve.
Dr. You Ji is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau.
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