Korea's defense question and Bandow's piece

By Deauwand Myers

Way back in May of 2013, geopolitical analyst Doug Bandow wrote an incendiary, yet not widely read, column for the conservative think tank the Cato Institute about South Korea's defense posture and its dependence on the United States for military preparedness. The title, and you won't believe it: "South Korea: Close Friend of the U.S., and a Defense Welfare Queen." The subtitle: "Even if Seoul is improbably believed to be an essential ally, it does not require U.S. defense subsidies."

So many things to unpack here. Welfare Queen is an old, tired, racist trope created by American conservatives stylizing black women as being sexually pliant, unfit mothers with multiple children, living a lavish lifestyle off of social welfare programs. How that trope, promulgated by President Ronald Reagan, has anything to do with South Korea and its military independence is beyond me. I don't see why the term would ever be used in any context, as it is a lie, and certainly not when writing about something as serious as a key Asian ally (South Korea) buffeted by two nuclear adversaries, China and North Korea.

I digress. There's a whole lot wrong with Bandow's piece, the title notwithstanding. Any novice would tell you an ally so geographically close to nuclear adversaries is in itself an asset for American diplomatic and defense priorities. Korean intelligence and experience in dealing with North Korea is invaluable in the continued monitoring of North Korea (and China). So yes, in Asia, South Korea is an essential ally.

Though deliberately worded to be low-key racist and as about as nuanced as a sledgehammer, part of Bandow's piece is worthy of discussion and consideration.

Should Korea, as wealthy and technologically advanced as its neighbor Japan is, take more proactive steps in defending itself, and would these proactive measures include commanding all forces in Korea if such a time arrived? This is called OPCON, or Operational Command, meaning that if a war broke out on the Korean Peninsula, the South Korean defense apparatus would take the lead in running military operations.

In June of 2022, Clint Work's policy paper, "No More Delays; Why It's Time to Move Forward With Wartime OPCON Transition: The history and evolution of the U.S.-ROK military command architecture reveal the inherent push and pull at the heart of the alliance" makes a forceful argument that it is past time for Korea to execute OPCON.

He writes, "Over time, the transfer of operational control (OPCON) has been complicated by a myriad of conceptual shifts, concerns regarding North Korea … increased tension between the U.S. and China … the alliance must either redouble its effort to move forward and transition wartime OPCON to a ROK-led combined command architecture or develop a more feasible arrangement."

Mr. Work is correct. There's not an easy fix to Korea's defense conundrum. But is a fix necessary? Korea and Japan are covered with what's called a "nuclear umbrella," mostly via American submarines.

Moreover, the Korean defense ministry has not been standing idly by in creating a better fighting force, one that could potentially take over OPCON and lead both Korean and American forces in battle. The reforming of compulsory conscription (all able-bodied men have to spend time in the military), increasing the salaries of career military officers, and a refining of logistics throughout Korea's armed services are meaningful examples. Most strikingly, in this regard, is Korea's advanced fighter jet system, an indigenous project jointly funded by Korea and Indonesia (wherein, upon completion, Indonesia will share in the technologies and use the same prototype for their own air force).

Korea has been taking hints from its Chinese and Japanese neighbors, both of which have homegrown fighter jet systems of their own. China has the Chengdu J-20, colloquially nicknamed the "Mighty Dragon." Japan has The Mitsubishi F-X (unofficially called F-3), a stealth fighter in late-staged development for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). This iteration will be Japan's first domestically-developed stealth fighter jet, replacing the Mitsubishi F-2 by the next decade or so. There are very few countries that can build and operate a domestically-developed fighter jet with proven stealth technologies.

Korea's own KAI KF-21 Boramae (formerly known as KF-X) is its answer to China's J-20 and Japan's F-3. The fighter jet, now in advanced stages of development like Japan's F-3, is meant to modernize the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) and bring costs down in the purchasing of jets. (Many advanced democracies embrace the costs of buying jets from Lockheed, for example, because domestically creating military jets, and airplanes more broadly, is time-consuming, technologically and logistically complex, and exceedingly expensive.

The KAI KF-21 is unabashedly a sign that the Korean government is seriously and deliberately considering a defense future where they are in charge and America is a helping partner.

Deauwand Myers (deauwand@hotmail.com) holds a master's degree in English literature and literary theory, and is an English professor outside of Seoul.