[VIEW] ROK-Japan relations, a moderate tension is necessary

President Moon Jae-in speaks during an emergency Cabinet meeting at Cheong Wa Dae on Friday to discuss Japan's removal of Korea from its list of trusted trading partners. Yonhap

By Hwang Jae-ho

With Japan's economic "retaliation" against the Korean Supreme Court's judgment on reparation over Japan's wartime forced labor, Korea-Japan relations are at their worst since they established diplomatic ties.

A Korean congressional delegation has visited Japan, but delegates were unable to meet the person in charge of Japanese politics. Later a bilateral talk between the ministers of foreign affairs in Thailand ended in a freeze.

In the end, on August 2, the Japanese Cabinet determined to exclude Korea from its White List. Japan's attach on Korea, just like the bombing of Pearl Harbor, is dramatically increasing Koreans' antipathy against Japan. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe these days is only an inch from being listed among 'Koreans' thee most detested Japanese" behind Toyotomi Hideyoshi who invaded Chosun in 1592 and Ito Hirobumi who enforced the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910.

Technically, Abe is one of the Trump types. In this sense, he has come up with "Japan First." From the Korean perspective, he's incompatible with this country, but he might be a "quite fine" leader from Japan's point of view. He rehabilitated the Japanese economy, which was in a vegetative state from the "lost 20 years" and presented a national vision.

The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States also actually comes from Abe's effort. It sometimes seems somewhat horrifying to witness how he is putting his plans for the normal state into action, step by step, even though he holds less than two-thirds in the Upper House. Revising the Pacific Constitution continues on from Abe's grandfather (Nobusuke Kishi) and father (Shintaro Abe), as well as Abe's "Japan Dream." Even thought Korea shares strategic values with Japan, Japan's national strategy does not include "China's friend" Korea.

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Abe's trade retaliation against Korea is serious ― but, we have to get used to it. Japan's diplomacy is following that of the U.S. in direction and action. However, this trade retaliation is no more than showing the limit of Japanese diplomacy itself. Strategically, Japan is not a novice but now is it the master. In fact the Japanese action seems heavy On August 1, Abe referred to the retaliation as "the action for damaging trust between countries" in regard to the judgment on Japan's wartime forced labor. Compared to China's invisible economic retaliation against Korea due to THAAD, Japan's diplomacy appears to be at a low level.

Japan's critical mistake is that it expanded the historical issue to the diplomacy and linked it with the economy. At first, international society may conclude that Korea indeed did not keep faith with Japan ― but, ultimately this will become a boomerang. If Japan imposes any extra sanctions on Korea, this game will not favor Japan any longer. Japan will again become the assailant that has insulted human dignity and threatened human life.

We can try to hold direct negotiations with Japan, although Tokyo is avoiding this. On the other hand, it would be better to make multilateral approaches through ROK-US-Japan or ROK-China-Japan to set the stage where Japan's contradiction can be tacitly revealed. At the same time, the approach must separate Abe and Japan itself. The hostility against Korea in Japan is escalating generally regardless of the conservatives or the progressives. However, there are still conscientious people in power. In addition, according to the data based on age, unlike the over-50s, the 30s still are favorable to Korea. Maybe during President Moon's visit to Japan for the ROK-China-Japan summit last year, if he had a chance to appeal personally either to university students or civil society, we could imagine something better now. Public diplomacy targeting these groups must be strengthened for these purposes.

Next, the two countries must discuss redefining their relations beyond the Basic Agreement in 1965. The current economic conflict is a measure to check out each other's internal strength and investigate potential power sharing in the establishment of a new order. This will be where Korea will prove its status and capability.

This conflict is not only an emotional response to the Supreme Court's decision or Korea's reliance on Japan's economy; it also embraces the issues of the strategies for changing the vertical industrial structure between Korea and Japan, high-tech competition for future growth, and restructuring the global value chain.

The major issues between Korea and Japan, such as the comfort women or forced labor, are in fact the after-effects of history. These issues, which were not clearly dealt with after the war, are reappearing in the cracks and chaos of the international order.

Because the post-war order was not sorted out in the past, the Korean Peninsula is still divided into two with a South-North conflict and a nuclear threat. Nevertheless, South Korea is bigger and stronger now and can speak louder than in the past.

The differences between the two leaders will strain Korea-Japan relations for the remaining two years of the Moon government. Continuing, there will be new Moons and Abes who will sail through the troubled seas. Of course, the competitive nature of two countries is unlikely to change fundamentally in the post-Moon and Abe era; however, now is probably an opportunity to seek change.

In the short term, the conflict will grow more severe until National Liberation Day (August 15), but after that Japan has its Emperor's coronation in October. This will put pressure for both Korea and Japan to maintain the confrontation. But one thing for sure is that now is not the time for negotiations. Rather than forcefully or ambiguously solving the problem in a rush, just letting the fester might be the best option for the future.

Hwang Jae-ho is a director of the Global Security Cooperation Center, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul.