Joseon Hell (II)

By Deauwand Myers

The Joseon Dynasty, Korea's last monarchical reign, ruled for five centuries. Much of modern and contemporary Korean culture, such as Confucianism, familial patriarchy, a high emphasis on exams for social mobility, the writing system (Hangul), and traditional Korean food is derived from this period.

Like any ideology, there are positive and negative elements within Confucianism, or Korea's Neo-Confucianism, particularly when applied to the current historical moment. Respect for elders, fealty to family, an appreciation for education, and a humanistic embrace of reason and rationality (something sorely needed in American politics, especially on the right) are examples of its better parts.

But Korea's hyper-modern lifestyles, the stresses of capitalism, materialism, consumerism, superficiality, and the unhealthy pursuit of absolute beauty lays bare the tensions with traditional Korean ethical/moral thought and its practical application.

The social sickness afflicting Korea is not new or unique. All developed and developing countries face the challenges of a changing socioeconomic, sociopolitical landscape heightened by global trade, depressed wages, and the burdens of funding social welfare programs for an increasingly aged population.

Though these problems are, as I mentioned, global, Korea's obsession with education as a means of gainful employment and the good life has led to an entire generation of young people who study more hours than they sleep. The stress of all this forced learning, without proper sleep, rest, recreation, and the pressure to perform well on tests have led to suicide being the highest cause of death for young Koreans.

Young Koreans in secondary and tertiary education have a word for all of this: Hell Joseon. In English, we'd call this Joseon Hell. As I wrote in my previous article, they see diminishing returns on the sacrifice of their entire childhood.

This has vast and long-term negative implications for Korean societies and much of the developed world. Consider Japan or much of Western Europe:

As societies become more advanced, women's rights, particularly in education and accruing wealth via gainful employment, almost always presages a decrease in the birthrate. Women have access to reproductive health, so they can control when, how many, or if they will have children. There's also a delaying or eschewing of marriage.

These are positive developments. As I've explained to people who find reproductive rights problematic, particularly safe and legal abortions and birth control, women being able to control the rate, manner, and timing of childbirth dramatically increases the socioeconomic elevation of women and society as a whole. Literally, all empirical evidence supports this.

An elevation of women as fully human and as first-class citizens is not the sole (or even primary) reason birthrates decline in developed societies. Poor wages, imperfect and brutal work/life balances, and insufficient childcare services often keep women (and men) from pursuing traditional families, and thus exacerbate the decline of a nation's population.

What Koreans of my generation and the proceeding one faces in Korea is no less than a total reorienting of societal expectations.

It's no longer sufficient or believable to ask young people studying or just entering the workplace to expect gainful employment or the attendant benefits (long-term promotions, pensions, and healthcare, for example).

This has potentially dire repercussions. If a society asks its young to behave, study, and work hard for the rewards of a life of dignity and as insurance against poverty, and then can't fulfill this social contract, belief in the social contract frays. Social cohesion becomes precarious. Institutions long held as unassailable are looked upon with distrust, alarm, and worse, disdain.

This isn't just true for the young, though the negative effects of an imperfect social contract most probably harms them the most. Middle-aged people who find their job security, absolute wages, savings, wealth, and the ability to create more wealth at risk or worse, non-existent, have a lot of thinking to do.

What happens to democracies when the socioeconomic ladders upon which it's built become dilapidated?

Concentration of wealth and power aren't just bad for moral reasons. Again and again, since democracies have existed, we see that when wealth gaps become outrageous, far left or far right and anti-democratic regimes often take over. Unregulated capitalism and the naked pursuit of wealth is the biggest enemy to capitalism and democracy.

When I teach young Korean adults, I wonder if working in higher education is a sham. Am I perpetrating a fraud?

No. Not yet, at least. All evidence points to the acquisition of higher education as integral in gainful employment. Further, since my university is a vocational college, hard, applicable and practical fields of expertise are where a lot of the new employment is being created.

The government still needs to do much more to lower the cost of education and encourage employment, particularly in small and midsized companies. A better, progressive tax policy and increasing welfare expenditures are good places to start.

Deauwand Myers holds a master's degree in English literature and literary theory, and is an English professor outside Seoul. He can be reached at deauwand@hotmail.com.