Sinophobia

By John Burton

Much attention in Washington is often given to the fraught relations between Korea and Japan due to its national security implications for the U.S. in Northeast Asia. Surprisingly, less attention is being paid among U.S. commentators to the unfavorable views that Koreans have about China, which could help the U.S. agenda in containing expansionist moves by Beijing.

President Moon Jae-in's explicit endorsement of the U.S. stance on the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea during his summit with President Joe Biden last month in Washington may have indeed reflected the public mood back home.

Sino-Korean relations have always been complex. Throughout most of their history, Koreans were comfortable with China's cultural influence. But that began to change at the turn of the 20th century with the rise of Korean nationalism.

Bilateral ties have been on the downslide since 2017 when China introduced economic retaliatory measures against Korea in response to Seoul's deployment of the U.S. THAAD anti-missile system. Beijing's moves to block Korea products, ban K-pop stars from China and curb Chinese tourism to Korea created the image of a bullying superpower, while awakening fears among Koreans about their country's growing trade dependence on its bigger neighbor. Korea is estimated to have suffered $7.5 billion in economic losses as a result of China's actions.

Koreans, who have strongly embraced democratic values after suffering decades of harsh military rule, have also been offended by China's security crackdown on Hong Kong and the treatment of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang as part of the aggressive nationalism of President Xi Jinping. The fact that the coronavirus originated in China has not helped matters.

A survey conducted by Hankook Research in March revealed that the unfavorable rating for China among Koreans was on a par with their views of North Korea and Japan, and that the majority thought that China posed an economic and security threat. In contrast, there was overwhelming support for the U.S., including its military presence in the region.

The very strong undercurrent of anti-Chinese sentiment has been fueled by social media, which claims that China is engaged in "cultural imperialism," as it tries to take credit for creating such iconic Korean cultural items as kimchi and hanbok.

The heavy use of social media by young Koreans has meant that their generation is more hostile to China than their elders, despite many of the latter remembering China's troops supporting North Korea during the Korean War. Korean fans of BTS were enraged after mainland Chinese social media last year attacked BTS member RM for thanking the U.S. for its support during the Korean War.

The pushback against China has now even been extended to Korean-Chinese, the so-called Joseonjok community. When the Ministry of Justice announced this month that it was revising the Nationality Act to make it easier for the children of permanent residents to receive Korean citizenship, it faced a backlash.

The reason for this backlash was that an estimated 95 percent of those who would benefit from receiving Korean citizenship would be Korean-Chinese, since many of them met the stipulation of having lived two generations or more in Korea or have "blood or cultural ties."

The status of Joseonjok has also become the subject of a partisan political debate. Conservative politicians have criticized the fact that Korean-Chinese who have lived in Korea for more than three years can vote in local elections because they are viewed as strong supporters of the governing Democratic Party of Korea. Right-wing conspiracy theorists also claimed that China was involved in "stealing" the National Assembly elections last year for President Moon, by tampering with voting machines.

Although Koreans consider the low birthrate, climate change and North Korea's nuclear program as greater threats to the country, anti-China sentiments are likely to be a factor in next March's presidential election.

Conservative critics of the Moon administration believe it has taken an excessively deferential and even humiliating approach to China. The conservative main opposition People Power Party has adopted a hawkish stance, calling for a more "confident" policy toward Beijing, driven by Korea's national interests and supporting a stronger U.S.-Korean military alliance.

As a result, Korea's careful balancing act between China, its biggest trading partner, and the U.S., its closest military ally, is at risk if the public's strong anti-China feeling continues.

But Beijing also needs to maintain a balancing act toward Seoul. If it pushes too hard against what it perceives as a tougher Korean policy, it will likely further harden public opinion against China. Such a public mood will in turn likely bring Korea closer to Japan in terms of defense cooperation, achieving what the U.S. desires.

If President Xi Jinping proceeds with his plans to travel to Korea once the COVID-19 pandemic is over, it should prove to be an interesting visit.

John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.