By John Burton
A quid pro quo was at the heart of the recent Washington summit between Presidents Moon Jae-in and Joe Biden: The U.S. president promised to pursue diplomatic engagement with North Korea in return for Moon accepting the principles supporting the U.S. strategy against China.
Seoul has wanted to avoid becoming involved in the strategic competition between China, its biggest trade partner, and the U.S., its main security ally, and being forced to choose sides. But Moon now appears to have tilted in favor of the U.S. in return for receiving several concessions from Biden.
Moon had been worried about whether the Biden administration would pursue active negotiations with North Korea to find a peaceful solution to ending its nuclear and missile programs.
The Biden administration signaled that it was willing to resume talks with Pyongyang by reaffirming the Singapore joint statement reached between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in 2018. Biden also announced the appointment of Ambassador Sung Kim as the special envoy for North Korea, a post he also held during the Obama administration.
These measures assured Seoul that Washington was not neglecting North Korea as a top foreign policy issue. It was also noteworthy that Moon was only the second foreign leader Biden met in person since coming into office in January.
The Biden administration agreed to build on the Singapore statement, which suggests that it will take a pragmatic approach instead of a tougher stance toward Kim Jong-un that had been indicated earlier by the U.S. president. Moon had worried that the U.S. might derail his efforts to secure a lasting rapprochement with the North, which Moon hoped would cement his legacy as President.
Still, questions remain whether Moon was completely satisfied with the outcome despite his public upbeat statements. Washington appears determined to maintain maximum sanctions against North Korea, which could hinder inter-Korean economic projects. Washington also insisted that the issue of human rights in North Korea should be emphasized, although this has previously caused Pyongyang to break off negotiations.
Moon may have to live with the fact that there may be only limited progress on North Korea during his remaining year in office. The best that can be hoped for is that North Korea will freeze its nuclear program in exchange for a partial easing of sanctions and a formal declaration to end the Korean War.
Moon may have also been disappointed by the U.S. response to his other big ask: the timely supply of COVID-19 vaccines to speed up slow vaccination rates in Korea. Although Washington agreed to supply vaccines to 550,000 Korean troops, this will do little to assuage the general public.
However, the two countries did agree to a global partnership to increase vaccine production, which promises to benefit Korea's future growth as a pharmaceutical hub. This would combine Korea's production capacity with U.S. technology to supply the vaccines to the global market on a contract manufacturing basis.
The more consequential and controversial part of Moon's visit could turn out to be his apparent support for Biden's policy on China. Korea endorsed the principles of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the security of the Taiwan Strait, which are viewed as code words for containing China's expansion. In addition, the leaders emphasized the importance of working with Japan to uphold "the rules-based order" in the region, another signal showing opposition to China's behavior.
Although the two leaders were careful to avoid mentioning China directly, other measures were announced that aligned Korea closer to the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
The most significant was the U.S. decision to end the remaining restrictions on Seoul's development of ballistic missiles. This would allow Korea to deploy missiles with heavy payloads that could reach China, which has drawn concern from Beijing.
Seoul has said its expanded missile program would spur its space program and develop satellites to monitor North Korea. But it also gives a boost to Moon's campaign to bolster Korea's own defense capabilities and potentially makes it a more powerful military ally with the U.S. in a regional conflict.
In addition, Moon pledged to invest $39.4 billion in the U.S. to create secure and resilient supply chains for key technologies such as semiconductors and advanced batteries. This would support Washington's desire to decouple its supply chains from China.
Beijing is likely to be unhappy with these developments. Moon could be approaching red lines that would eventually lead Beijing to take tough economic retaliation measures.
Moreover, China may be less willing to play a mediating role in North Korea's denuclearization process, setting back the goal that Moon wanted to pursue in Washington ― creating the conditions for a resumption of fruitful dialogue with Pyongyang.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
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Seoul has wanted to avoid becoming involved in the strategic competition between China, its biggest trade partner, and the U.S., its main security ally, and being forced to choose sides. But Moon now appears to have tilted in favor of the U.S. in return for receiving several concessions from Biden.
Moon had been worried about whether the Biden administration would pursue active negotiations with North Korea to find a peaceful solution to ending its nuclear and missile programs.
The Biden administration signaled that it was willing to resume talks with Pyongyang by reaffirming the Singapore joint statement reached between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in 2018. Biden also announced the appointment of Ambassador Sung Kim as the special envoy for North Korea, a post he also held during the Obama administration.
These measures assured Seoul that Washington was not neglecting North Korea as a top foreign policy issue. It was also noteworthy that Moon was only the second foreign leader Biden met in person since coming into office in January.
The Biden administration agreed to build on the Singapore statement, which suggests that it will take a pragmatic approach instead of a tougher stance toward Kim Jong-un that had been indicated earlier by the U.S. president. Moon had worried that the U.S. might derail his efforts to secure a lasting rapprochement with the North, which Moon hoped would cement his legacy as President.
Still, questions remain whether Moon was completely satisfied with the outcome despite his public upbeat statements. Washington appears determined to maintain maximum sanctions against North Korea, which could hinder inter-Korean economic projects. Washington also insisted that the issue of human rights in North Korea should be emphasized, although this has previously caused Pyongyang to break off negotiations.
Moon may have to live with the fact that there may be only limited progress on North Korea during his remaining year in office. The best that can be hoped for is that North Korea will freeze its nuclear program in exchange for a partial easing of sanctions and a formal declaration to end the Korean War.
Moon may have also been disappointed by the U.S. response to his other big ask: the timely supply of COVID-19 vaccines to speed up slow vaccination rates in Korea. Although Washington agreed to supply vaccines to 550,000 Korean troops, this will do little to assuage the general public.
However, the two countries did agree to a global partnership to increase vaccine production, which promises to benefit Korea's future growth as a pharmaceutical hub. This would combine Korea's production capacity with U.S. technology to supply the vaccines to the global market on a contract manufacturing basis.
The more consequential and controversial part of Moon's visit could turn out to be his apparent support for Biden's policy on China. Korea endorsed the principles of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the security of the Taiwan Strait, which are viewed as code words for containing China's expansion. In addition, the leaders emphasized the importance of working with Japan to uphold "the rules-based order" in the region, another signal showing opposition to China's behavior.
Although the two leaders were careful to avoid mentioning China directly, other measures were announced that aligned Korea closer to the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
The most significant was the U.S. decision to end the remaining restrictions on Seoul's development of ballistic missiles. This would allow Korea to deploy missiles with heavy payloads that could reach China, which has drawn concern from Beijing.
Seoul has said its expanded missile program would spur its space program and develop satellites to monitor North Korea. But it also gives a boost to Moon's campaign to bolster Korea's own defense capabilities and potentially makes it a more powerful military ally with the U.S. in a regional conflict.
In addition, Moon pledged to invest $39.4 billion in the U.S. to create secure and resilient supply chains for key technologies such as semiconductors and advanced batteries. This would support Washington's desire to decouple its supply chains from China.
Beijing is likely to be unhappy with these developments. Moon could be approaching red lines that would eventually lead Beijing to take tough economic retaliation measures.
Moreover, China may be less willing to play a mediating role in North Korea's denuclearization process, setting back the goal that Moon wanted to pursue in Washington ― creating the conditions for a resumption of fruitful dialogue with Pyongyang.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
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