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I thought the only practical way forward would be through further developing a phased package deal complete with North Korean registration of all nuclear weapons, materials and facilities and a credible program for verification, which I used to call a "roadmap." Thus, at every opportunity I had to talk with U.S. officials, starting with Steve Biegun, I tried to tell them the advantages of the roadmap. They agreed, but kept on saying that they were working on it.
Finally, they declared the roadmap idea in January, 2019, when Biegun came to speak at the Stanford University for his first public speech as the special envoy. Soon after that, Biegun visited North Korea, and Trump and Kim Jung-un met in Hanoi late in February for their second meeting. I was keeping my fingers crossed that the roadmap would take root through those visits and meetings.
It did not happen. As I later learned from U.S. officials, North Korean officials had one single response; they did not have any mandate to discuss a denuclearization plan. At the same time, they assured U.S. officials that their leader would come to Hanoi with a plan to meet U.S. expectations. This was not the case. What was offered by North Korea was a typical piece of North Korean "salami" and Trump walked out of the room.
Four years later, the new Biden administration is now reviewing North Korea policy, and Washington, D.C. is abuzz with what will be in the new plan. Among those suggestions, I observe one idea emerging, which can be summed up, citing David Ignatius' terminology, as preaching the virtue of finding a "way station" for Biden, meaning the U.S. initially moving its focus away from denuclearization to preventing proliferation and development of delivery vehicles such as SLBM's by North Korea.
Again, I know where the idea comes from. This is another form of expressing frustration with the "salami tactics" of North Korea, especially when the new Biden administration is inundated with both domestic and foreign policy challenges. Still, I think the idea raises far more problems than solutions for many reasons, some of which I want to share.
One, the "way station" idea will be very difficult to move forward, because North Korean demands will prove to be exorbitantly high. In my observation, North Korea, before Hanoi, 2019, seems to have had genuine expectation that Trump would be the person capable of moving away from demanding denuclearization by North Korea.
What North Korea realized in Hanoi instead was that even Trump held on to the same position. That realization explains the deep sense of frustration North Korea has been gripped with since then. Against such a backdrop, were the U.S. to offer something like a "way station" idea, North Korea would very likely take it as a sign of a long awaited U.S. departure from its consistent position; North Korea would think that its steadfast ambition of resolving economic, diplomatic and political challenges through all consuming weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development has been finally vindicated.
This will prove to be a huge moral, diplomatic and even economic boost for North Korea, which will try to bargain from a "position of strength" and make exorbitant demands.
Two, the "way station" idea will significantly undermine U.S. leverage over North Korean denuclearization. The advantages of a package deal arise from deploying the full range of diplomatic, information, military and economic tools to persuade North Korea to agree to the final goal of denuclearization at the exit of the roadmap, even if implementation of the roadmap would progress in pre-arranged stages.
The "way station" ideas look like a piecemeal approach, which can be easily taken advantage of by North Korea and its well-practiced "salami tactics." North Korea, having benefitted from a huge moral, diplomatic and even economic boost arising from the "way station" offer, will have little incentive to agree to denuclearization.
Three, such a development can seriously undermine the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence to Korea and Japan. As North Korean WMD capability goes up, the importance of strengthening U.S. extended deterrence also goes up for obvious reasons.
To meet that goal, we have to augment the combined allied capability for the four Ds: deter, defeat, defend and dissuade. At the same time, any action which may be interpreted as undermining the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence should be avoided. The "way station" ideas may be interpreted as decoupling the security interests of the U.S. from that of Korea and Japan, and thus undermine the credibility of extended deterrence.
Ahn Ho-young (hyahn78@mofa.or.kr) is president of the University of North Korean Studies. He served as Korean ambassador to the United States and first vice foreign minister.