By Lee Seong-hyon
The statements from three ranking Chinese diplomats, who sent out similar messages to the United States in August, emit the signature feature of China's diplomatic strategy: "be prepared both for war and peace."
On the one hand, China says it wants to cooperate with the U.S., but it also adds that if that doesn't materialize, it is ready for "wind and rain" in U.S.-China relations.
Beijing flatly disowns the possibility of political reform that Washington has long demanded, but instead warns the United States is trying to "drive a wedge" between the Chinese people and the Communist Party, pronouncing that such an attempt is "doomed to failure."
China says it wants to return to the normal track in bilateral relations, but it is the U.S. that should make efforts to make it a reality. There is no mention of what China can do and will do to improve the situation. Moreover, the United States is described as an unjust country that causes trade disputes with other countries and imposes economic sanctions, while China is depicted solely as a country that is a steadfast proponent of openness, engagement and cooperation.
While articulating Beijing's own core interests, it repeatedly tried to imprint a psychological conditioning that Washington should not violate the Chinese "red line." It proposes to the U.S. that the two superpowers work to prevent a collision, but as a prerequisite, the United States must recognize the legitimacy of China's socialist political system.
In different renditions of the notion of "equal relationship," China underscored that Washington should accept Beijing as a powerhouse of America's equal class.
China's stance, aforementioned, can be construed that it has not evolved from the notion of "new type of major power relations" (xinxing daguo guanxi), which Xi Jinping proposed in 2013 to Barack Obama in their "no-tie" summit. At the summit, Xi famously said that the Pacific Ocean is big enough to contain both the United States and China. It took a while for U.S. officials to realize that what Xi actually implied was that the U.S. should renounce the half of the Pacific, and concede it to be part of the Chinese sphere of influence.
To sum up, the three Chinese diplomats, Yang Jiechi, Wang Yi and Cui Tiankai, were on a mission to accomplish the same goal. They divided their roles by focusing on history, the perceived absurdity of the United States and public diplomacy in Washington. In all this, they tried to advance China's position, while seeking to weaken that of the United States, by utilizing words of both the carrot and the stick.
Looking back, when the U.S. normalized relations with China 40 years ago through Nixon's historic visit, and when it helped China to join the WTO 20 years ago, it did so because it believed that if China were to be incorporated into the orbit of the international economic system, China would also become part of rules-based international norms. Currently, the United States has reached a conclusion that this approach had a fatal flaw; it was based on a false premise. So, Washington is now executing a fundamental "reset" of U.S.-China relations. This appears to be directed at all-round aspects of U.S.-China relations, including technical decoupling, military competition, visa restrictions, academic exchanges and even social media platforms.
Against the backdrop, the U.S.-China relationship is expected to continue to heat up in the future as the two sides continue to maintain tense conflicts, even after the U.S. presidential election in November. The rivalry for power and influence between the U.S. and China will be also prominently noticeable in their fierce diplomatic wresting to earn more allies and snatching the other's friends.
Recently, there was a tense standoff between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea. China's state news agency mentioned a U.S. high-altitude reconnaissance plane entering a no-fly zone set by China and the possibility that the plane likely flew from a U.S. air base in South Korea. This indicates that South Korea could be unwittingly involved in the U.S.-China physical conflict.
The Moon Jae-in government may still believe the notion that South Korea's best diplomatic code of conduct is not to choose a side, amid intensifying U.S.-China competition. The problem is what if the U.S. and China are asking South Korea to choose, and choose only one.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
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On the one hand, China says it wants to cooperate with the U.S., but it also adds that if that doesn't materialize, it is ready for "wind and rain" in U.S.-China relations.
Beijing flatly disowns the possibility of political reform that Washington has long demanded, but instead warns the United States is trying to "drive a wedge" between the Chinese people and the Communist Party, pronouncing that such an attempt is "doomed to failure."
China says it wants to return to the normal track in bilateral relations, but it is the U.S. that should make efforts to make it a reality. There is no mention of what China can do and will do to improve the situation. Moreover, the United States is described as an unjust country that causes trade disputes with other countries and imposes economic sanctions, while China is depicted solely as a country that is a steadfast proponent of openness, engagement and cooperation.
While articulating Beijing's own core interests, it repeatedly tried to imprint a psychological conditioning that Washington should not violate the Chinese "red line." It proposes to the U.S. that the two superpowers work to prevent a collision, but as a prerequisite, the United States must recognize the legitimacy of China's socialist political system.
In different renditions of the notion of "equal relationship," China underscored that Washington should accept Beijing as a powerhouse of America's equal class.
China's stance, aforementioned, can be construed that it has not evolved from the notion of "new type of major power relations" (xinxing daguo guanxi), which Xi Jinping proposed in 2013 to Barack Obama in their "no-tie" summit. At the summit, Xi famously said that the Pacific Ocean is big enough to contain both the United States and China. It took a while for U.S. officials to realize that what Xi actually implied was that the U.S. should renounce the half of the Pacific, and concede it to be part of the Chinese sphere of influence.
To sum up, the three Chinese diplomats, Yang Jiechi, Wang Yi and Cui Tiankai, were on a mission to accomplish the same goal. They divided their roles by focusing on history, the perceived absurdity of the United States and public diplomacy in Washington. In all this, they tried to advance China's position, while seeking to weaken that of the United States, by utilizing words of both the carrot and the stick.
Looking back, when the U.S. normalized relations with China 40 years ago through Nixon's historic visit, and when it helped China to join the WTO 20 years ago, it did so because it believed that if China were to be incorporated into the orbit of the international economic system, China would also become part of rules-based international norms. Currently, the United States has reached a conclusion that this approach had a fatal flaw; it was based on a false premise. So, Washington is now executing a fundamental "reset" of U.S.-China relations. This appears to be directed at all-round aspects of U.S.-China relations, including technical decoupling, military competition, visa restrictions, academic exchanges and even social media platforms.
Against the backdrop, the U.S.-China relationship is expected to continue to heat up in the future as the two sides continue to maintain tense conflicts, even after the U.S. presidential election in November. The rivalry for power and influence between the U.S. and China will be also prominently noticeable in their fierce diplomatic wresting to earn more allies and snatching the other's friends.
Recently, there was a tense standoff between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea. China's state news agency mentioned a U.S. high-altitude reconnaissance plane entering a no-fly zone set by China and the possibility that the plane likely flew from a U.S. air base in South Korea. This indicates that South Korea could be unwittingly involved in the U.S.-China physical conflict.
The Moon Jae-in government may still believe the notion that South Korea's best diplomatic code of conduct is not to choose a side, amid intensifying U.S.-China competition. The problem is what if the U.S. and China are asking South Korea to choose, and choose only one.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
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