By Lee Seong-hyon
Below is a snapshot of what the world has learned over the past two years of negotiations between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump. The views expressed are not my own. They were taken from various seminars and conferences I attended throughout these years.
The first view seems to suggest that Kim is, after all, not likely to forgo nuclear weapons. Observers and scholars pointed out that the collapse of the Hanoi summit, held in February 2019, as the "eureka" moment. Since then, the negotiations have been in a protracted comatose state.
Furthermore, economic sanctions on North Korea caused far more disruption than what was originally anticipated. This was another lesson drawn from the Hanoi summit. There were ― and still are ― some analysts and scholars who have questioned the effectiveness of sanctions. Therefore, the American side has been wondering, "What makes North Korea tick?" In Hanoi, Kim made a singular demand for an end to sanctions. The American side took it as a "revelation."
In Trump's own words, "Basically, they wanted the sanctions lifted in their entirety and we couldn't do that. They were willing to de-nuke a large portion of the areas that we wanted, but we couldn't give up all of the sanctions for that."
These two views are the most common reactions in the policy community since the Hanoi summit.
Regarding the sanction, Kim himself also appeared to bluntly acknowledge the fatal effects of the sanctions. In his remarks to a four-day Workers' Party plenum in late December, Kim said, "The DPRK-U.S. standoff which has lasted century after century has now been compressed to a clear standoff between self-reliance and sanctions."
Those in support of sanctions feel the approach had a profound impact on North Korea from the second half of 2017 when additional U.N. resolutions against the hermit state were imposed after Pyongyang test-fired ICBMs and carried out its sixth nuclear test.
These sanctions completely banned North Korea from exporting its three main exports: minerals, textile products and seafood. They also banned the export of North Korean laborers and cut annual importable supplies of refined petroleum exports from 2 million barrels a year to 500,000 barrels in December 2017.
Combined, these measures reportedly reduced more than 90 percent of North Korea's exports to the outside world.
Now what? Initial hopes for a nuclear breakthrough that started from the Singapore summit in June 2018 were very high but pessimism rose after the collapse of the Hanoi summit. The deadlocked talks between Washington and Pyongyang continues. People begin to wonder whether this marks the end of denuclearization negotiations.
Skeptics seem to share this sentiment. The recent two-year nuclear negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. signaled the end of denuclearization negotiations, argued Lee Yong-joon, a former deputy foreign minister, in a recent media column. Lee has handled nuclear negotiations with North Korea. Even if other types of nuclear negotiations take place in the future, they will no longer be "denuclearization" negotiations but nuclear "disarmament" negotiations, according to him.
Does this mark the end of an era for North Korea? Not necessarily.
As long as U.N. sanctions persist, it is highly unlikely that North Korea's economy will prosper even if limited smuggling through China were to continue. The stunted economic state will continue to serve as a destabilizing factor for the domestic system. It will never achieve economic prosperity through foreign investment and trade Kim envisions.
No matter how favorable a North Korean regime is to South Korea, it will be difficult for Seoul to provide massive economic aid to the North due to U.N. sanctions in place. This is the "curse of success" brought by North Korea's nuclear armament. After all, North Korea is likely to face another arduous march of hardship for a prolonged period ahead.
This is Kim's dilemma. He has nuclear weapons, but his country continues to live in poverty. Based on the realization that the possibility of achieving prosperity through nuclear armament is slim, Kim might reconsider his nuclear game. This is the logic presented by proponents of continued negotiations with North Korea.
Interestingly, Kim reportedly told Mike Pompeo during the latter's visit to Pyongyang (when he was the CIA director): "I'm a father and a husband. And I have children. And I don't want my children to carry the nuclear weapon on their back their whole life."
This insinuates Kim's willingness to trade off nuclear weapons when conditions are met. Well, then, the nuclear negotiations are not yet dead, the optimistic camp may argue.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director, the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
 |
The first view seems to suggest that Kim is, after all, not likely to forgo nuclear weapons. Observers and scholars pointed out that the collapse of the Hanoi summit, held in February 2019, as the "eureka" moment. Since then, the negotiations have been in a protracted comatose state.
Furthermore, economic sanctions on North Korea caused far more disruption than what was originally anticipated. This was another lesson drawn from the Hanoi summit. There were ― and still are ― some analysts and scholars who have questioned the effectiveness of sanctions. Therefore, the American side has been wondering, "What makes North Korea tick?" In Hanoi, Kim made a singular demand for an end to sanctions. The American side took it as a "revelation."
In Trump's own words, "Basically, they wanted the sanctions lifted in their entirety and we couldn't do that. They were willing to de-nuke a large portion of the areas that we wanted, but we couldn't give up all of the sanctions for that."
These two views are the most common reactions in the policy community since the Hanoi summit.
Regarding the sanction, Kim himself also appeared to bluntly acknowledge the fatal effects of the sanctions. In his remarks to a four-day Workers' Party plenum in late December, Kim said, "The DPRK-U.S. standoff which has lasted century after century has now been compressed to a clear standoff between self-reliance and sanctions."
Those in support of sanctions feel the approach had a profound impact on North Korea from the second half of 2017 when additional U.N. resolutions against the hermit state were imposed after Pyongyang test-fired ICBMs and carried out its sixth nuclear test.
These sanctions completely banned North Korea from exporting its three main exports: minerals, textile products and seafood. They also banned the export of North Korean laborers and cut annual importable supplies of refined petroleum exports from 2 million barrels a year to 500,000 barrels in December 2017.
Combined, these measures reportedly reduced more than 90 percent of North Korea's exports to the outside world.
Now what? Initial hopes for a nuclear breakthrough that started from the Singapore summit in June 2018 were very high but pessimism rose after the collapse of the Hanoi summit. The deadlocked talks between Washington and Pyongyang continues. People begin to wonder whether this marks the end of denuclearization negotiations.
Skeptics seem to share this sentiment. The recent two-year nuclear negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. signaled the end of denuclearization negotiations, argued Lee Yong-joon, a former deputy foreign minister, in a recent media column. Lee has handled nuclear negotiations with North Korea. Even if other types of nuclear negotiations take place in the future, they will no longer be "denuclearization" negotiations but nuclear "disarmament" negotiations, according to him.
Does this mark the end of an era for North Korea? Not necessarily.
As long as U.N. sanctions persist, it is highly unlikely that North Korea's economy will prosper even if limited smuggling through China were to continue. The stunted economic state will continue to serve as a destabilizing factor for the domestic system. It will never achieve economic prosperity through foreign investment and trade Kim envisions.
No matter how favorable a North Korean regime is to South Korea, it will be difficult for Seoul to provide massive economic aid to the North due to U.N. sanctions in place. This is the "curse of success" brought by North Korea's nuclear armament. After all, North Korea is likely to face another arduous march of hardship for a prolonged period ahead.
This is Kim's dilemma. He has nuclear weapons, but his country continues to live in poverty. Based on the realization that the possibility of achieving prosperity through nuclear armament is slim, Kim might reconsider his nuclear game. This is the logic presented by proponents of continued negotiations with North Korea.
Interestingly, Kim reportedly told Mike Pompeo during the latter's visit to Pyongyang (when he was the CIA director): "I'm a father and a husband. And I have children. And I don't want my children to carry the nuclear weapon on their back their whole life."
This insinuates Kim's willingness to trade off nuclear weapons when conditions are met. Well, then, the nuclear negotiations are not yet dead, the optimistic camp may argue.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director, the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
![[ANALYSIS] Pandemic awakens demand for data-driven automation](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/2b05d621a193420abef7ee24b95eab3d.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
