By Lee Seong-hyon
As of today, there is no definitive answer as to whether sanctions on Pyongyang are working or not. There is a widely polarized view on it, like day and night. This is a delicate and hotly debated topic among South Korean scholars.
Oddly, President Donald Trump, who claims to enjoy a good relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, keeps sanctions on North Korea. This would indicate that Washington is a believer in sanctions as a key motivating factor behind North Korea's nuclear moves.
Over 90 percent of North Korea's trade is with China. That means Beijing is the key. China is the most formidable influencer in the game of sanctions. This is one narrative many Chinese scholars are often shy of publicly owning, because acknowledging it would entail the responsibility for implementing sanctions. But they tend to recognize it in private. Some are even smug about the fact that China wields such gargantuan clout over the North.
Russia also is a significant player in the sanctions game. As reported in various media, there are tens of thousands of North Korean workers in Russia's Far East, for instance. The bulk cash they send back home is seen as undermining the effectiveness of sanctions. That's why the U.S., through the U.N., has been urging member states to submit repatriation reports on North Korean workers.
In the evolutionary life of sanctions, the second half of 2017 and first half of 2018, roughly speaking, could be the period when sanctions against North Korea were bona fide biting, simply because China was more serious than ever in carrying them out. There were two reasons. The first was Trump's "fire and fury" remarks.
In August, 2017, while at his golf resort in New Jersey, Trump said: "North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States." He warned: "They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen." China was alarmed. U.S. military action against North Korea would also undermine China's own security as North Korea is on its border.
Beijing needed to convince Washington that sanctions were working and hurt North Korea enough, and therefore Trump didn't need to resort to kinetic options to punish the North. On this notion, China was sincere.
Second, as the signs of a trade war between Washington and Beijing were budding, Trump publicly said that if China would cooperate on the North Korean issue with the United States, he would soften on trade. China wanted to avoid a frontal collision with Trump. So, they took his offer.
Did China really implement sanctions faithfully? There are many naysayers. But on this matter, and at that particular period of the time, I am a person who is willing to give due credit to Beijing. At that time, China implemented sanctions stricter than the U.N. demands. It even launched its own sanctions against North Korea. For instance, a garment with a zipper couldn't get through customs in Dandong, the main Chinese gateway to North Korea, on the Yalu River, because the zipper was made of metal. The Chinese inspector didn't bother to check "which metal." As a result, the default was "all metals." North Korean merchants moaned about this.
The "good ole" days were gone. There are a few reasons. First, China felt vindicated in its sense of being cheated when Trump didn't relax on the trade dispute, after all the cooperation it gave. On the contrary, the trade war only intensified.
There was murmuring in some pockets of the Chinese analytic community that went something like this: "Trump was going after North Korea, and now he is going after us. This must be Trump's style. We underestimated him." Second, China has also buckled up to the reality that Washington and Beijing are locked in a structural competition for global leadership.
Is there a chance that China will go back to its heavy-duty mode on sanctions? The U.S. State Department still, from time to time, sounds out that Beijing could do more on sanctions. Will China honor the call? Geopolitics matters, and China carefully watches Washington's moves.
As Washington has been strengthening its Indo-Pacific strategy, China has been also ramping up its drive for "socialist friendship solidarity," with Russia and North Korea. It's not a new Cold War, but many traits resemble that era. It means for China, this is not a time to alienate a member of its tribe.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director, the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
 |
Oddly, President Donald Trump, who claims to enjoy a good relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, keeps sanctions on North Korea. This would indicate that Washington is a believer in sanctions as a key motivating factor behind North Korea's nuclear moves.
Over 90 percent of North Korea's trade is with China. That means Beijing is the key. China is the most formidable influencer in the game of sanctions. This is one narrative many Chinese scholars are often shy of publicly owning, because acknowledging it would entail the responsibility for implementing sanctions. But they tend to recognize it in private. Some are even smug about the fact that China wields such gargantuan clout over the North.
Russia also is a significant player in the sanctions game. As reported in various media, there are tens of thousands of North Korean workers in Russia's Far East, for instance. The bulk cash they send back home is seen as undermining the effectiveness of sanctions. That's why the U.S., through the U.N., has been urging member states to submit repatriation reports on North Korean workers.
In the evolutionary life of sanctions, the second half of 2017 and first half of 2018, roughly speaking, could be the period when sanctions against North Korea were bona fide biting, simply because China was more serious than ever in carrying them out. There were two reasons. The first was Trump's "fire and fury" remarks.
In August, 2017, while at his golf resort in New Jersey, Trump said: "North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States." He warned: "They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen." China was alarmed. U.S. military action against North Korea would also undermine China's own security as North Korea is on its border.
Beijing needed to convince Washington that sanctions were working and hurt North Korea enough, and therefore Trump didn't need to resort to kinetic options to punish the North. On this notion, China was sincere.
Second, as the signs of a trade war between Washington and Beijing were budding, Trump publicly said that if China would cooperate on the North Korean issue with the United States, he would soften on trade. China wanted to avoid a frontal collision with Trump. So, they took his offer.
Did China really implement sanctions faithfully? There are many naysayers. But on this matter, and at that particular period of the time, I am a person who is willing to give due credit to Beijing. At that time, China implemented sanctions stricter than the U.N. demands. It even launched its own sanctions against North Korea. For instance, a garment with a zipper couldn't get through customs in Dandong, the main Chinese gateway to North Korea, on the Yalu River, because the zipper was made of metal. The Chinese inspector didn't bother to check "which metal." As a result, the default was "all metals." North Korean merchants moaned about this.
The "good ole" days were gone. There are a few reasons. First, China felt vindicated in its sense of being cheated when Trump didn't relax on the trade dispute, after all the cooperation it gave. On the contrary, the trade war only intensified.
There was murmuring in some pockets of the Chinese analytic community that went something like this: "Trump was going after North Korea, and now he is going after us. This must be Trump's style. We underestimated him." Second, China has also buckled up to the reality that Washington and Beijing are locked in a structural competition for global leadership.
Is there a chance that China will go back to its heavy-duty mode on sanctions? The U.S. State Department still, from time to time, sounds out that Beijing could do more on sanctions. Will China honor the call? Geopolitics matters, and China carefully watches Washington's moves.
As Washington has been strengthening its Indo-Pacific strategy, China has been also ramping up its drive for "socialist friendship solidarity," with Russia and North Korea. It's not a new Cold War, but many traits resemble that era. It means for China, this is not a time to alienate a member of its tribe.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director, the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
![[INTERVIEW] A touch of authenticity in Korea's Mexican cuisine scene](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/fe12560b2c8f402dbfc2dbc8eaa18c2a.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
![[INTERVIEW] 'Extended deterrence is best option to ensure peace on Korean Peninsula'](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/newsV2/images/202302/07dded4a953e426e87a955bfba1d638e.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
![[INTERVIEW] US-NK summit is unlikely in 2023: Korea Society](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/e955fbc4d45d4554a4872e07178b657a.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
![[INTERVIEW] IMF expects no recession for Korean economy](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/113efdff98f448669023285500576943.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
