By Lee Seong-hyon
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North Korea seems to be emitting a renewed sense of confidence in dealing with the Americans since Kim's fourth meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping last month, in which they discussed "the matter of joint research and coordination of the denuclearization negotiation."
Its significance was not duly appreciated at that time. Kim will naturally use this Chinese backing as leverage with the U.S. It also makes sense for Kim to use China to hedge against the possibility of slow progress with the U.S., by making sure that he maintains good relationship with President Xi.
But it is more than that.
In Kim's New Year address, he made a veiled warning to the U.S.: "If the U.S. doesn't keep the promise it made in front of the world and misjudges the North Korean people's patience, imposes unilateral concessions and continues with sanctions and pressure, we also don't have any other choice but to explore a new path."
Many experts at that time interpreted Kim's "new path" as North Korea returning to missile launches and nuclear tests. But now, it is increasingly clear that the "new path" Kim meant was to align North Korea closer to China.
But how closer?
I noted in my institution's policy analysis at that time that Kim's visit was "qualitatively" different from his previous three visits to China. The previous three could all, more or less, be characterized as Pyongyang's efforts to mend ties with China and build mutual mojo, and reclaim emotional affinity and ideological bonding, after several years of an estranged relationship.
This latest visit also reveals that North Korea may have made a strategic shift. It has begun to look to China as a viable alternative to the United States.
Last year's prolonged negotiations stalemate taught a lesson to Kim. As the leader of a smaller and weaker party, it made him realize the limits of negotiating power vis-a-vis with Washington. Kim needs China's help. That's the reality.
For the past 25 years of nuclear negotiations, North Korea largely ignored China, bypassed China, even humiliated China, to directly reach out to the U.S. However, when it hit a wall with the U.S., it came to an awareness that it couldn't solely rely on the U.S. to have its needs met and its problems solved.
Kim's prime needs are twofold: economic and security. Theoretically speaking, China alone can satisfy North Korea's entire needs. China could meet North Korea's economic needs while Washington refuses to lift punitive economic sanctions. China could also meet North Korea's security needs by shielding it from possible kinetic operations by the U.S.
There is a deep-seated sense within Beijing that as long as China strongly opposes the U.S. military option against North Korea, Washington will not go on the path to attack the North. Otherwise, the very likely scenario will be the second Korean War, which Washington also wants to avoid.
From the Chinese side, Beijing will welcome Pyongyang's warming gestures. Amid worsening rivalry and competition between the U.S., North Korea's strategic value to China is bound to increase in the region's geopolitical chess game.
Given that this is the 70th anniversary of the establishing diplomatic ties between Beijing and Pyongyang, there will be a raft of high-level exchanges between the two, unprecedented in recent decades. Xi will visit North Korea for the first time since he became the top leader of China in late 2012. The last time, a top Chinese leader visited North Korea was more than 10 years ago ― Hu Jintao in 2005.
In Asian culture, you don't visit your neighbor without a gift. In addition, there are accumulated Sino-North Korean pending agreements, including economic projects that could be signed off on at the top levels of the two nations. Xi's visit will naturally serve the occasion to do this.
All in all, China is North Korea's "new path." As China's economic power and national strength has soared over the last 25 years, now as the number two country in the world, North Korea is increasingly seeing China as an alternative to the U.S.
Even if the negotiation deadlock persists between Washington and Pyongyang, North Korea will be less likely to secretly reach out to the U.S., as it did in the past, seeking dialogue. This may be the first time in their nuclear saga that "the U.S. factor"will be less relevant from North Korea's strategic perspective.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
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