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For Xi Jinping, the summit was about bolstering his international credentials ahead of his unprecedented third term next year. For Joe Biden, it was about managing voter sentiment ahead of next year's mid-term elections and allying American allies' fears of increasing international disorder. In other words, they needed to take a breather from what Biden called "extreme competition" to attend to their respective needs, while having an opportunity to size up the other side through the summit.
However, it was Xi, overall, who took clear advantage of the summit.
"A big-power demeanor!" (Daguo fengfan!). This was a one-line summary comment by a Chinese commenter left under a video clip of the summit between Biden and Xi. Browsing down the entire comment section, one can find many similar comments. The video footage showed Xi looking confident and relaxed all the time. The comments were an affirmative response to Xi's appearance.
Xi told Biden, "China and the United States are the world's two largest economies and are permanent members of the U.N Security Council. Let's strengthen communication and cooperation with each other." They are nice words to hear, but if one thinks about it twice, it's also a statement with the intention of giving the impression that China and the U.S. are now "equal" powers.
The Chinese media also highlighted the fact that it was the U.S. side that proposed the meeting first. The implied notion is that the one who is more desperate reaches out first. To fit the Chinese narrative, in late September, the U.S. allowed Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou to return home, creating an amicable atmosphere for the summit. The Chinese state television broadcaster, CCTV, live-broadcasted her home-coming moment, with the title, "Diplomatic Victory over the United States!" (Dui mei waijiao shengli).
Undoubtedly for Xi, the main audience for this summit was domestic and it was linked to his political status. On November 11, days before the summit, the Chinese Communist Party passed a "historical resolution," only the third since its founding 100 years ago, cementing Xi's status as the monolithic leader.
It was Xi's clever move to use the history resolution to "pre-book," one year in advance, his third term, which will be formalized at the 20th Party Plenum next fall. There is already a widespread atmosphere in China that regards Xi's third term as a fait accompli.
Then came the summit.
It was a clever maneuver for China to delay its announcement of the full content of the historical resolution for days and then unveil it on the same day that the U.S.-China summit was held. The state-controlled CCTV television anchor recited Xi's historical resolution for the duration of 27 minutes as a "news" item. As a result, the other news, the U.S.-China summit, held on the same day, was sidelined, getting a passing mention.
China's propaganda apparatus intentionally gave little weight to the summit, as if that was not very important for a great leader like Xi. In sum, China made good use of the summit to bolster the prominence of Xi as a powerful leader, also as the "victory lap" to the pre-booking of Xi's third term.
For Biden, the main audience of the summit consisted of U.S. allies that felt increasingly uneasy, fearing that the U.S. would drive its relationship with China to a catastrophe. The recent news of a possible "war" over Taiwan was a justifier for such a concern. China, on its own, painted the U.S., not China itself, as the destabilizing power of the international order. Against the backdrop, it was necessary for Biden to show publicly that the U.S. could responsibly manage its competition with China, by establishing a "guardrail."
Biden also needed to comfort Wall Street financiers and American companies who still view the Chinese market positively and bemoan the U.S.-China tension as undermining their business interests. The mid-term elections are coming next year. They are powerful constituencies. The overall U.S. domestic response toward Biden after the summit was not extremely positive, but it was not too negative either.
Lee Seong-hyon, Ph.D. (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), is a visiting scholar at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies.