By Andrew Hammond
Joe Biden's foreign policy has so far been defined by decisions taken toward far-flung nations including China and Afghanistan, yet events closer to home are now demanding his greater attention.
Protests across Cuba, a presidential assassination in Haiti, plus unrest in Venezuela and Nicaragua mean U.S. "red lights" are going off across South America. Add to this too the fact that Biden has a cool relationship with the leader of the so-called giant of the region, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, who has been called the "Tropical Trump" for his maverick populism.
Politically, this is bad news for Biden, especially given the potential impact on the electoral politics of U.S. "swing states" like Florida. However, it also matters more broadly too given wider U.S. dependence on the region, including the fact that Venezuela is the third largest oil exporter to the United States and has one of the world's largest proven oil reserves.
Combine this with geopolitics too. Some military officials have long warned that U.S. attention to other geographies including the Middle East and Asia-Pacific has left a power vacuum in South America that China and Russia are filling.
Take the example of Admiral James Stavridis, the commander of U.S. Southern Command from 2006 to 2009, who highlighted that his entire budget for 12 months was what the then-commander of U.S. Central Command received for only a few days of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The charge sheet here is that while Washington has been "sleeping," Moscow and Beijing have been deepening their support for illiberal regimes, such as Venezuela, that complicate regional security and hold back the regional transition toward democracy. Moreover, with the region hit hard by the pandemic, there is a fear that China in particular is looking to embed its influence by building more than three dozen ports in the region with significant loans that can be used for political leverage.
Cuba policy is only one of the case studies of U.S. drift in the region. April marked the 10th anniversary of Fidel Castro's exit from power and the Biden administration is under growing pressure from Congress to nail down its stance toward the socialist island state.
Biden said on the 2020 campaign trail he wanted a significant reset in relations, but in the absence of that happening, legislators in Congress are seeking to fill the vacuum. Take the example of Republican Senators Marco Rubio, Rick Scott, and Ted Cruz, who is of Cuban-American heritage, all of whom have potential 2024 presidential ambitions, and are seeking to block any Biden liberalization initiative akin to that championed by Barack Obama in his final years in office.
The partisan gulf between Democrats and Republicans on Cuba will not disappear soon, and is one further reason why Biden may move only gradually on reversing Trump-era policies toward the island. While a reset in relations remains likely, it may need to wait till the latter phase of his term.
This Cuba example underlines that the challenging U.S. relationship with much of South America did not begin with Biden's presidency. Ties were troubled during the Trump era too, including with the-then president threatening "military options" to intervene in Venezuela.
Trump's wild rhetoric was unfortunate given long memories on the continent of U.S. interventionism there dating back to when the U.S. invaded Mexico in the mid-18 century. Since then, Washington has intervened regularly across the region, including Haiti in 1994, and this lingers in the region's collective memory.
Amidst all the tumult of recent weeks, what many in Washington hope is that Biden could yet bring to U.S. policy a genuine strategic focus, building from initiatives such the original 1990s North America Free Trade Agreement which consolidated Mexico's embrace of free market, international-orientated policies.
This would require a much broader, comprehensive approach that could help bind in the region's other emerging markets and/or newly democratic governments toward pro-market reform through U.S. commitment to economic, political, and security partnerships throughout the hemisphere.
To be sure, some modest attempts have been made already in this direction. For instance, the Obama administration's brainchild of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Trump subsequently rejected, includes both Chile and Peru, but was never intended as a comprehensive regional strategy.
Amid growing concern about post-pandemic regional social unrest; governance challenges; and elections that could shift economic policy orientation, there may now be a limited opportunity to get traction with this agenda in coming months.
The "window" comes from the economic rebound with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) last week lifting previous growth forecasts for the region to around 6 percent, driven by the strong performances of the Brazilian and Mexican economies.
Despite the legion of obstacles, domestic and foreign, the prizes on the horizon are stronger bilateral partnerships; locking in U.S. regional influence; and a new foundation stone for sustainable growth. Will Biden find the bandwidth to seize the opportunity, or let it slip?
Andrew Hammond (andrewkorea@outlook.com) is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.
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Protests across Cuba, a presidential assassination in Haiti, plus unrest in Venezuela and Nicaragua mean U.S. "red lights" are going off across South America. Add to this too the fact that Biden has a cool relationship with the leader of the so-called giant of the region, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, who has been called the "Tropical Trump" for his maverick populism.
Politically, this is bad news for Biden, especially given the potential impact on the electoral politics of U.S. "swing states" like Florida. However, it also matters more broadly too given wider U.S. dependence on the region, including the fact that Venezuela is the third largest oil exporter to the United States and has one of the world's largest proven oil reserves.
Combine this with geopolitics too. Some military officials have long warned that U.S. attention to other geographies including the Middle East and Asia-Pacific has left a power vacuum in South America that China and Russia are filling.
Take the example of Admiral James Stavridis, the commander of U.S. Southern Command from 2006 to 2009, who highlighted that his entire budget for 12 months was what the then-commander of U.S. Central Command received for only a few days of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The charge sheet here is that while Washington has been "sleeping," Moscow and Beijing have been deepening their support for illiberal regimes, such as Venezuela, that complicate regional security and hold back the regional transition toward democracy. Moreover, with the region hit hard by the pandemic, there is a fear that China in particular is looking to embed its influence by building more than three dozen ports in the region with significant loans that can be used for political leverage.
Cuba policy is only one of the case studies of U.S. drift in the region. April marked the 10th anniversary of Fidel Castro's exit from power and the Biden administration is under growing pressure from Congress to nail down its stance toward the socialist island state.
Biden said on the 2020 campaign trail he wanted a significant reset in relations, but in the absence of that happening, legislators in Congress are seeking to fill the vacuum. Take the example of Republican Senators Marco Rubio, Rick Scott, and Ted Cruz, who is of Cuban-American heritage, all of whom have potential 2024 presidential ambitions, and are seeking to block any Biden liberalization initiative akin to that championed by Barack Obama in his final years in office.
The partisan gulf between Democrats and Republicans on Cuba will not disappear soon, and is one further reason why Biden may move only gradually on reversing Trump-era policies toward the island. While a reset in relations remains likely, it may need to wait till the latter phase of his term.
This Cuba example underlines that the challenging U.S. relationship with much of South America did not begin with Biden's presidency. Ties were troubled during the Trump era too, including with the-then president threatening "military options" to intervene in Venezuela.
Trump's wild rhetoric was unfortunate given long memories on the continent of U.S. interventionism there dating back to when the U.S. invaded Mexico in the mid-18 century. Since then, Washington has intervened regularly across the region, including Haiti in 1994, and this lingers in the region's collective memory.
Amidst all the tumult of recent weeks, what many in Washington hope is that Biden could yet bring to U.S. policy a genuine strategic focus, building from initiatives such the original 1990s North America Free Trade Agreement which consolidated Mexico's embrace of free market, international-orientated policies.
This would require a much broader, comprehensive approach that could help bind in the region's other emerging markets and/or newly democratic governments toward pro-market reform through U.S. commitment to economic, political, and security partnerships throughout the hemisphere.
To be sure, some modest attempts have been made already in this direction. For instance, the Obama administration's brainchild of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Trump subsequently rejected, includes both Chile and Peru, but was never intended as a comprehensive regional strategy.
Amid growing concern about post-pandemic regional social unrest; governance challenges; and elections that could shift economic policy orientation, there may now be a limited opportunity to get traction with this agenda in coming months.
The "window" comes from the economic rebound with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) last week lifting previous growth forecasts for the region to around 6 percent, driven by the strong performances of the Brazilian and Mexican economies.
Despite the legion of obstacles, domestic and foreign, the prizes on the horizon are stronger bilateral partnerships; locking in U.S. regional influence; and a new foundation stone for sustainable growth. Will Biden find the bandwidth to seize the opportunity, or let it slip?
Andrew Hammond (andrewkorea@outlook.com) is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.
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