By Ahn Ho-young
I am a firm believer in institution-building. If there's an important mission, build appropriate institutions. It is one surefire, sometimes essential, way of achieving an objective.
When I was appointed as ambassador to the United States in 2013, I had a mission: How to further strengthen the Korea-U.S. alliance. I checked available institutions, and one highly useful one was the "2+2 ministerial dialogue."
However, it was not yet a fully satisfactory tool, because it was being held on an ad hoc basis. It had to be arranged each time either party saw the need. Thus, I gave myself a corollary mission: Regularize "2+2" during my assignment in the U.S.
The 2+2 track record as far as 2013 was that it used to be held in even-numbered years. It was first held in Seoul in July 2010 in the aftermath of the frigate Cheonan incident and on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Korean War.
The second meeting took place in Washington in June 2012. Thus, I waited until 2014 before approaching my counterparts at the State Department and the Pentagon. I reminded them of the security and foreign policy challenges on the Korean Peninsula, in Northeast Asia and around the world.
I reminded them of the importance and untapped potentials of the alliance. I reminded them of the usefulness of holding 2+2 in 2014. They agreed with me on all of the points, but reminded me of the practical difficulties of getting hold of two "peripatetic" secretaries at the same place and at the same time.
This practical difficulty was resolved and 2+2 was held in Washington in October, back to back with the Security Council Meeting (SCM). I was genuinely impressed with the quality of consultations. More importantly, I later learned that the principals, the 2+2 ministers themselves, saw the usefulness of the meeting. This certainly made my job easier when I worked to arrange the meeting again in 2016.
There was much reason to be encouraged about the progress thus being made with 2+2 as an institution.
However, my self-imposed corollary mission was not complete yet, with my State Department and Pentagon colleagues still reluctant to regularize it. I continued to persevere, and it finally happened on the occasion of President Moon Jae-in's visit to Washington in June 2017.
The joint statement read; "To increase coordination on alliance issues, the leaders committed the foreign affairs and defense agencies of the two countries to regularize a 2+2 ministerial meeting …" The irony is that 2+2, which used to be held every two years before the regularization, has not been held for the past five years. Finally, another is being held in Seoul on March 17.
There will be no shortage of issues for the upcoming round of 2+2. Based upon my own observation of the previous meetings at close range, let me make a wish list of issues to be taken up this time. As for the bilateral alliance issues, ministers must focus on restoring the trust which has been damaged badly in the past several years.
Trust in each other's commitment is the very basis of an alliance. Trust cannot be built without a common perception of threats, a shared sense of priority in the efforts to be made to address the threats and an appreciation of the common values underlying the alliance.
Moving on to regional issues, ministers are expected to discuss U.S.-China and Korea-Japan relations. I often hear views suggesting the advantage of Korea holding onto "strategic ambiguity" between the U.S. and China. It may look useful for the short term, but will lead to Korea's losing credibility with both the U.S. and China.
The U.S. suspicions of Korea's "slant to China" will deepen; while China will feel assured that Korea is the "weakest link" in the network of U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific. That is why I have long suggested that we must maintain "strategic clarity." As for Korea-Japan relations, it had long been based on the dual track of separating the issues of history from common strategic and economic interests between the two countries.
On the issue of history, during the Obama presidency, the U.S. government would often and openly express its views. Several weeks ago, when requested a comment on the wartime sex slavery issue, the Department of State reiterated Obama-era terminology of "egregious violation of human rights."
Each time ministers met in the past, they devoted much of their time to discussing global issues, agreeing that our alliance is increasingly a global one. I often hear concerns expressed both in Korea and abroad that Korea seems to be increasingly inward- and rearward-looking.
Such a perception about Korea, if left unaddressed, can have self-fulfilling impact upon our growth as a nation and the psyche of our citizens, especially of the young. I hope that the upcoming session will be able to remove such concerns at least among the four most important actors for our foreign and security policies.
Ahn Ho-young (hyahn78@mofa.or.kr) is president of the University of North Korean Studies. He served as Korean ambassador to the United States and first vice foreign minister.
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When I was appointed as ambassador to the United States in 2013, I had a mission: How to further strengthen the Korea-U.S. alliance. I checked available institutions, and one highly useful one was the "2+2 ministerial dialogue."
However, it was not yet a fully satisfactory tool, because it was being held on an ad hoc basis. It had to be arranged each time either party saw the need. Thus, I gave myself a corollary mission: Regularize "2+2" during my assignment in the U.S.
The 2+2 track record as far as 2013 was that it used to be held in even-numbered years. It was first held in Seoul in July 2010 in the aftermath of the frigate Cheonan incident and on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Korean War.
The second meeting took place in Washington in June 2012. Thus, I waited until 2014 before approaching my counterparts at the State Department and the Pentagon. I reminded them of the security and foreign policy challenges on the Korean Peninsula, in Northeast Asia and around the world.
I reminded them of the importance and untapped potentials of the alliance. I reminded them of the usefulness of holding 2+2 in 2014. They agreed with me on all of the points, but reminded me of the practical difficulties of getting hold of two "peripatetic" secretaries at the same place and at the same time.
This practical difficulty was resolved and 2+2 was held in Washington in October, back to back with the Security Council Meeting (SCM). I was genuinely impressed with the quality of consultations. More importantly, I later learned that the principals, the 2+2 ministers themselves, saw the usefulness of the meeting. This certainly made my job easier when I worked to arrange the meeting again in 2016.
There was much reason to be encouraged about the progress thus being made with 2+2 as an institution.
However, my self-imposed corollary mission was not complete yet, with my State Department and Pentagon colleagues still reluctant to regularize it. I continued to persevere, and it finally happened on the occasion of President Moon Jae-in's visit to Washington in June 2017.
The joint statement read; "To increase coordination on alliance issues, the leaders committed the foreign affairs and defense agencies of the two countries to regularize a 2+2 ministerial meeting …" The irony is that 2+2, which used to be held every two years before the regularization, has not been held for the past five years. Finally, another is being held in Seoul on March 17.
There will be no shortage of issues for the upcoming round of 2+2. Based upon my own observation of the previous meetings at close range, let me make a wish list of issues to be taken up this time. As for the bilateral alliance issues, ministers must focus on restoring the trust which has been damaged badly in the past several years.
Trust in each other's commitment is the very basis of an alliance. Trust cannot be built without a common perception of threats, a shared sense of priority in the efforts to be made to address the threats and an appreciation of the common values underlying the alliance.
Moving on to regional issues, ministers are expected to discuss U.S.-China and Korea-Japan relations. I often hear views suggesting the advantage of Korea holding onto "strategic ambiguity" between the U.S. and China. It may look useful for the short term, but will lead to Korea's losing credibility with both the U.S. and China.
The U.S. suspicions of Korea's "slant to China" will deepen; while China will feel assured that Korea is the "weakest link" in the network of U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific. That is why I have long suggested that we must maintain "strategic clarity." As for Korea-Japan relations, it had long been based on the dual track of separating the issues of history from common strategic and economic interests between the two countries.
On the issue of history, during the Obama presidency, the U.S. government would often and openly express its views. Several weeks ago, when requested a comment on the wartime sex slavery issue, the Department of State reiterated Obama-era terminology of "egregious violation of human rights."
Each time ministers met in the past, they devoted much of their time to discussing global issues, agreeing that our alliance is increasingly a global one. I often hear concerns expressed both in Korea and abroad that Korea seems to be increasingly inward- and rearward-looking.
Such a perception about Korea, if left unaddressed, can have self-fulfilling impact upon our growth as a nation and the psyche of our citizens, especially of the young. I hope that the upcoming session will be able to remove such concerns at least among the four most important actors for our foreign and security policies.
Ahn Ho-young (hyahn78@mofa.or.kr) is president of the University of North Korean Studies. He served as Korean ambassador to the United States and first vice foreign minister.
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