Why Kim visits China again?

By Lee Seong-hyon

Here's the initial observation on the latest intrigue behind Kim Jong-un's China visit. First of all, even for many Chinese analysts on North Korea, Kim's visit to China this time came as something "unexpected." Kim already visited China three times last year. Therefore, it was widely expected that, it would be Chinese leader Xi Jinping's turn to visit North Korea. Xi himself said he would do so, during his meeting with President Moon Jae-in November last year.

It's also notable that Kim is visiting China on his 35th birthday. This inevitably emits a sense of "urgency." Otherwise, why would the North Korean leader "skip" his birthday party at home to make a journey all the way to China, unless there is a pressing need that compelled him to do so, the logic would go.

Interestingly, Kim took a train as his means of transportation. Kim's immediate two previous trips to China were via air. When Kim's train passed through the Chinese city of Dandong that borders North Korea, it served as an automatic trigger for the watchful international media to react and make headlines. If Kim was to travel by air, it would have been less visible to the media. In addition, compared to air travel, a train trip offers the media more time to cover his journey.

It is then reasonable to believe that Kim is staging his trip to China to be noticed. But for what purpose?

Kim's choice of traveling to China on the day of his birthday and his choice of transportation discharges the impression that there is something "special" about the China-North Korea relationship. It establishes an appearance of strong bonding between Xi and Kim. Currently, Kim is negotiating with Trump on nuclear weapons. Currently, Xi is negotiating with Trump on trade.

Since last year, North Korea's relationship with China has changed dramatically ― for the better. Since last year, China's relationship with the United States has changed dramatically ― for the worse. Kim Jong-un's visit to China, is unfolding in front of this backdrop.

There is a complexity of strategic calculus intertwined among different players in Pyongyang, Washington, and Beijing. The visit also happens amid Trump's public statement that a second summit with Kim will be held soon.

Regarding Kim, it's reasonable to believe that his trip is a "preparation" for his upcoming summit with Trump, who sent out mixed messages. Trump said he would meet with Kim, but made it clear that economic sanctions, currently imposed on North Korea, would remain in place, going against Kim's wishes.

For Xi, North Korea's denuclearization is not necessarily his most immediate policy priority. China's immediate and paramount priority is to "soft land" the ongoing trade war with Washington.

China is seen as the country that has the largest influence over North Korea. Against the backdrop, China will be tempted to think to "utilize" Kim's visit to serve China's interest.

If that is the case, we may speculate that China may use the occasion to nudge Kim to be more forthcoming in denuclearization measures as a "goodwill" sign of China's cooperation with the United States.

Washington maintains that the trade war (between the U.S. and China) and the denuclearization (between the U.S. and North Korea) are "separate" matters. We also agree, in theory.

We should remember that Trump, upon inauguration, proposed to China that he would be willing to be soft on China on trade if China cooperates on the North Korean issue.

Trump has already openly complained, at least three times, that "China was behind" North Korea's defiant attitude that led to the negotiations being stalled last year. Will the same thing happen again? Is China playing the "North Korea card" against Washington?

It is unwarranted to conclude that Xi will again turn out to be a spoiler. We should be open to the possibility that China this time may turn out to be a positive force in mediating between Pyongyang and Washington.

During Kim's new-year speech, he said he will closely consult "parties to the Korean War armistice" to transform the armistice state to the peace state. Without naming China, it indicates China. It's Kim's invitation for China to play a more active role in North Korea's stalemate in negotiations with the U.S.

Taken together, depending on how Xi envisions China's relationship with the U.S., the outcome of Xi's talking with Kim will have ramifications for both the denuclearization and the trade war.

Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.

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