China-NK relations in 2019

By Lee Seong-hyon

One year ago, I argued in the "2018 Global Politics Forecast" (an annual publication by the Sejong Institute) that China could stage a summit with North Korea in the New Year. First, from their recent history, I was cognizant that for China, the North Korean problem is not so much about North Korea per se, but a part of Beijing's bigger regional strategy in dealing with the U.S.

Second, I identified both corroborative and unfavorable factors for the summit, factoring in Chinese top leader Xi Jinping's assertive foreign policy posture after the 19th Party Congress and the deteriorating trend of U.S.-China relational dynamics. I concluded China would want to have a summit with North Korea in an attempt to "secure China's influence over North Korea" vis-a-vis the U.S. The summit materialized in March.

I am not a fortune-teller. But there were two factors I referenced at that time in orienting my inner reasoning, which I didn't divulge in my writing. One, North Korea declared it had mastered "nuclear deterrence" with the successful launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile that could reach the continental United States.

North Korea may be bluffing, but I was intrigued by the North's public posture. By making it public (regardless of Pyongyang's real nuclear capability), it now could "afford" to be more open in its international outreach. North Korea would now shift its national mandate from securing nuclear deterrence to building its economy. Economic development requires more interaction with the outside world, trade and foreign investment.

On the part of China, even though the relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang had been icy for several years, I noted that China also made consistent efforts to reach out to the North, for instance, by sending high-level envoys (such as Vice President Li Yuanchao in 2013, Politburo member Liu Yunshan in 2015) even when the ties between the two nations hit the bottom.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping had refused to hold a summit meeting with Kim Jong-un, due to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. If Kim would display a posture that he would now prioritize economic development, not the nuclear business, it would serve as a conduit for China to utilize the "opportunity" to meet with Kim, without Xi losing face.

Second, since Kim Jong-un became North Korea's leader in late 2011, he and Xi had not held a single summit meeting. There was awareness in both Beijing and Pyongyang that a top-level meeting would be necessary to clear some of the accumulated bilateral glitches and pending issues.

In 2018, China staged not just one, but three summit meetings with Kim Jong-un.

Looking ahead in 2019, I expect the biggest variable in the China-North Korea relations would be "not" North Korea's nuclear weapons, but U.S.-China relations. They are structurally heading into a deeper rivalry, mistrust, competition and conflict.

Amid deepening rivalry and conflict between the U.S. and China, North Korea's strategic value to China is bound to rise. In the New Year, this time, Xi will visit North Korea to see Kim, not the other way around. The timing will be planned carefully. The level of extravaganza of the Sino-North Korea summit "in Pyongyang" will easily outstrip the Singapore summit. There will be many, very many agreements of cooperation between the two socialist states.

Since the U.S.-China bad mojo is likely to persist for a foreseeable mid- to long-term period, China's strategic calculus on North Korea would adjust accordingly. But this may not manifest too obviously. On the surface, both the U.S. and China want North Korea's denuclearization. In fact, "North Korea" remains the only positive bilateral area where both Washington and Beijing cooperate, as Washington pundits joke these days. It has become the last remaining symbol of cooperation that both Washington and Beijing are willing to play along ― for the time being.

Interestingly, Washington is less cognizant about appreciating that North Korea is also a "sore spot" for China. Namely, China cannot afford to lose North Korea to the United States. That's why China was apprehensive about the rapid improvement of relations between Trump and Kim Jong-un at their Singapore meeting.

When Trump and Kim emerged from their eight-hour meeting and issued a succinct four-point statement, China was keen to find out whether there was any additional "under-the-table agreement" between Trump and Kim that would put China at a strategic disadvantage. Jealousy is often quite powerful in motivating people as well as state actors.

Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.

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