Mao's nuclear libido

By Lee Seong-hyon

When the Truman administration in 1945 dropped two nuclear bombs on Japan, Mao Zedong's reaction was uncommon. He belittled the nuclear bomb as a "paper tiger" (zhi lao hu). He said that "American reactionaries" were trying to scare people by exaggerating the power of nuclear weapons. Mao's remarks were for domestic audience. He was trying to reassure the Chinese people.

Yet Mao gradually became aware of the importance of possessing nuclear weapons to survive in the jungle of international politics. In fact, he led the development of China's own nuclear weapons.

According to the seminal work by John Lewis and Xue Litai of Stanford University, based on their study on diplomatic files and interviews with the Chinese people who were involved in the engineering of the bombs, the most important motive for China to develop nuclear weapons was the United States.

In the period during the Korean War truce negotiations, Eisenhower, former commander of NATO and the president-elect, suggested the possibility of a nuclear attack. Eisenhower publicly warned that there was a "possibility" of using nuclear weapons against China if the Korean War truce negotiations were stalled due to China's unwillingness.

In the height of military tensions between Washington and Beijing during the First Taiwan Strait crisis in 1954-55, Mao and other Communist Party leaders in China became aware that it would be indispensable to China's security to have nuclear weapons.

In particular, Mao saw nuclear weapons as an effective "deterrence strategy" for China against then much more powerful rivals by having the "second-strike" ability to retaliate with a nuclear weapon after it was attacked by an adversary.

Following the first atomic bomb test in 1964, China successfully conducted its first hydrogen bomb test in 1967.

Officially, China's last nuclear test was in 1996, its 22nd underground nuclear test and also the 45th nuclear test in its entirety. The test in 1996 was the last because China joined the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that year. Since then, however, China has not conducted nuclear tests ― yet has been doing "simulations." And in terms of simulation frequency, China is reportedly ahead of the U.S.

The number of nuclear weapons possessed by China is a state secret. There are various estimates. The Federation of American Scientists estimated China had 260 nuclear weapons in 2015. The U.S. Department of State estimates China has 270 nuclear weapons as of 2017.

One interesting question is why China, the world's second-largest economy trailing only behind the United States, has relatively few nuclear weapons. China has the smallest number of nuclear weapons among the five U.N. Security Council members, including Britain and France.

It's partly due to China's immemorial concern, if not obsession, to seek a "centralized control" of its large country, including the nuclear arsenal. During the socio-political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) that concurred with the nuclear development and key upgrading period of China, the Chinese leadership imposed too much importance on the centralized management of nuclear weapons.

China's nuclear power was small, but keeping it that way also makes it easy to manage. Another reason is the "asymmetrical" nature of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are so powerful and destructive that, even having a small number of nukes would be sufficient to deter an enemy state. So far, at least, this rule of thumb proves to be right. No nuclear country has ever been attacked by another nuclear state.

Specifically, Mao believed a small number of atomic bombs were enough to scare foes. Mao said, "We must keep it a little, keep it small, and keep it at a high level!"

Mao and North Korea's founder Kim Il-sung (Kim Jong-un's grandfather) happened to have something in common in their nuclear karma. Kim Il-sung's awareness of the necessity of developing nuclear weapons was also first formed when he saw the power of the atomic bombs the U.S. dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Both China and North Korea had previously had difficulties in developing nuclear weapons, faced with strong opposition from Washington. Both Mao and Kim also believed nuclear weapons were not just merely weapons, but the apparatus to give them voices and clout in international politics.

Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is the director, Center for Chinese Studies; and also the Director, Department of Unification Strategy at Sejong Institute.

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