Why China needs to make concessions for end-of-war declaration?

By Lee Seong-hyon

China is fully aware the U.S. is reluctant to announce an end-of-war declaration with North Korea because of China itself. Both the U.S. and China view such a declaration in terms of their geopolitical competition, which boils down to the question of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).

As the negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington have stagnated with the issue of the end-of-war declaration, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un displayed willingness for a significant concession. He told Chung Eui-yong, director of South Korea's National Security Office and a special envoy to North Korea, that "the declaration has nothing to do with the withdrawal of the USFK and the U.S.-ROK military alliance." The real problem lies with China that competes with the U.S. in East Asia.

Geopolitically, strategically and structurally, the presence of the USFK is a "dagger" to China's throat. The U.S. seems uncertain about the future consequences of it endorsing an end-of-war declaration with North Korea because doing so, by design, it gives a convenient "justification" for China to demand the withdrawal of the USFK.

In justifying the presence of the USFK, the U.S. has referred to the "North Korean threat," which was also cited when it deployed a THAAD missile battery in South Korea. Despite this, China opposed the deployment at the very top leadership level because it believed the missile shield would jeopardize China's regional strategy. Similarly, the U.S. recognizes a formal end to the war would seriously undermine its strategy in the Korean Peninsula, which has become "East Asia's Balkans," where powerful countries' interests converge and collide.

The end of the war would signify that "peace" will replace the "war" and the war game scenarios on the Korean Peninsula, as part of joint contingency plans by the U.S. and South Korea, will no longer be needed. Following this logic, China is likely to demand the USFK withdraw, by raising a very powerful question that "Now peace is settled on the peninsula, why would the U.S. troops wish to stay?"

During the summit between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un in the Chinese city of Dalian, it was understood that Xi requested Kim to side with the Chinese stance on the issue of the USFK (And this is also consistent with Trump's loud and open speculation that "China was behind").

When it comes to the declaration of the end of war, China has never changed its stance that it must be included, despite Xi's reported remarks at a recent forum in Vladivostok that some observers misinterpreted. As a party to the Korean War, China wishes to be engaged with the "entire process" of peacemaking on the Korean Peninsula from the symbolic declaration to the formal peace treaty.

The reason China is obsessed with the declaration stems partially from its deep emotional attachment to the Korean War. The key question, however, should be whether China would be a "disruptor" if Seoul and Washington decide to include it. This should be at the heart of policy analysis for South Korea that has developed discord with China regarding the latter's participation in the peace process.

The common view is that China wishes to participate in the peace process because it seeks to raise its voice and maximize its influence by complicating and delaying the negotiation process. The more fundamental question that deserves greater attention is whether China itself supports an end to the war.

Surprisingly, the Chinese government remains reticent. In his visit to New York last week, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi remarked that "the declaration would help build basic trust between the U.S. and North Korea and facilitate denuclearization" but did not clarify where China stands. Perhaps the answer is right there, in China's keeping a low profile about the issue. In other words, China believes the end of the war is beneficial to its own strategic gains. That is the reason that China does not say as much.

China believes the end-of-war declaration, albeit symbolic, would serve as a prelude to reduction of regular U.S. drills and downsizing of U.S. military deployment. China would expect that the "diminished" presence of the U.S. power projection would benefit China's broader and fundamental strategy in the region. It would therefore go against China's interest to disrupt the peace process.

China would be very much content as long as it is invited to be in the room as a quiet "observer," yet without labeling as such. That would suffice to save face to the domestic audience. But for China to participate in the peace negotiations, it must also yield something. The U.S. says North Korean steps for denuclearization so far are not adequate. The U.S. deliberately delays declaring an end to the war with China in mind, in order to give another implicit signal to Beijing.

Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is the director, Center for Chinese Studies; and also the director, Department of Unification Strategy at Sejong Institute.

Site Map E-paper Subscribe Register LogIn
Site Map E-paper Subscribe Register LogIn