By Lee Seong-hyon
Despite the North's latest and most powerful nuclear test so far, the U.S. calculus of looking at the North Korean conundrum has not likely changed fundamentally. This is because other dramatic options, ranging from military strikes to dialogue, pose greater risks and uncertainty.
North Korea's sixth nuclear test is seen by many as a "watershed" moment. If so, will Washington and Beijing's calculus on North Korea change accordingly? Not likely, for the short term. At this time, the United States will likely continue its "maximum pressure" on North Korea, with harsher sanctions. For China, it will try to "manage" the situation, by its usual appeal for "calm" on all sides. In short, Washington and Beijing are not likely to diverge much from their preexisting preferences for the status quo. This is bad. But they think other options are worse.
The U.S. has the capability to flatten the hilly North Korea or execute surgical strikes or behead Kim Jong-un by dispatching Special Forces. But the U.S. is reluctant to use the military option. Modern day military options think through the "exit strategy." The problem with Pyongyang is that there is no good exit strategy that guarantees the safety of the two U.S. regional allies, Seoul and Tokyo.
On the other hand, it's difficult for Washington to suddenly warm up to Pyongyang, showing the eager appearance of have a talk. It has the danger of appearing "rewarding" North Korea's bad behavior. More importantly, asking North Korea to freeze its nuclear programs in exchange for freezing U.S. military drills or some other concessions will quickly be retooled by Pyongyang as a forum that recognizes North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.
In addition, North Korea may agree to freeze, but not denuclearize. It will be North Korea's win and Washington's loss. In that case, the possibility for denuclearization becomes zero.
Turning to China, the current high drama and standoff between Trump and Kim isn't too bad, ironically. It puts China on the backburner. In the past, China was always on the spot whenever North Korea conducted nuclear and missile provocations. "North Korea is China's problem" had long been the mainstay of the international media's way of framing the issue. Trump changed it all. By prioritizing North Korea and publically engaging in Twitter politics on the North, Trump took it onto himself. Now, North Korea has become American's problem, not China's.
This also perfectly fits with the Chinese effort to portray the North Korea's nuclear saga inherently as an issue between Washington and Pyongyang, not between Beijing and Pyongyang. In addition, China can frame North Korea's latest successful nuclear test as Trump's policy failure.
In the bigger scheme of things, China's strategic interest is not necessarily focused on the Korean Peninsula issue per se, but how to make best use of the current tension for its own geopolitical advantage, amid deepening competition and rivalry with the U.S. For China, Trump's rollercoaster with Kim or his alienation of South Korea, a key U.S. ally, is a natural boon that undermines the U.S. leadership in the region and serves China's interest. At a time like this, it's best for China to sit on the fence.
Under these circumstances, China is less prone to proactively solve the North Korean problem, but rather "manage" the situation, by calling for "calm" on all sides and asking them to refrain from engaging acts that raise regional tension.
In the mean time, China will also brush aside the international demand that it cut off its crude oil supply to North Korea, saying that's something to be discussed at the United Nations. Bringing in Russia to the arena will bolster China's position, as Xi Jinping just invited Vladimir Putin to China's southern city of Xiamen where they said they would "deal appropriately" with North Korea.
All in all, for the time being, the U.S. is likely to continue its sanctions-oriented approach on North Korea, while increasing military drills near North Korea. That will accomplish the political goal of U.S. domestic politics. While "all options are on the table," there is no better option than sanctions. China, on the other hand, will play the role of a "peacemaker" and call for "calm" on all sides, and make sure North Korea is an American problem to solve, not China's. All these then lead to one final question: What are South Korea's options?
Lee Seong-hyon, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute. Reach him at sunnybbsfs@gmail.com
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North Korea's sixth nuclear test is seen by many as a "watershed" moment. If so, will Washington and Beijing's calculus on North Korea change accordingly? Not likely, for the short term. At this time, the United States will likely continue its "maximum pressure" on North Korea, with harsher sanctions. For China, it will try to "manage" the situation, by its usual appeal for "calm" on all sides. In short, Washington and Beijing are not likely to diverge much from their preexisting preferences for the status quo. This is bad. But they think other options are worse.
The U.S. has the capability to flatten the hilly North Korea or execute surgical strikes or behead Kim Jong-un by dispatching Special Forces. But the U.S. is reluctant to use the military option. Modern day military options think through the "exit strategy." The problem with Pyongyang is that there is no good exit strategy that guarantees the safety of the two U.S. regional allies, Seoul and Tokyo.
On the other hand, it's difficult for Washington to suddenly warm up to Pyongyang, showing the eager appearance of have a talk. It has the danger of appearing "rewarding" North Korea's bad behavior. More importantly, asking North Korea to freeze its nuclear programs in exchange for freezing U.S. military drills or some other concessions will quickly be retooled by Pyongyang as a forum that recognizes North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.
In addition, North Korea may agree to freeze, but not denuclearize. It will be North Korea's win and Washington's loss. In that case, the possibility for denuclearization becomes zero.
Turning to China, the current high drama and standoff between Trump and Kim isn't too bad, ironically. It puts China on the backburner. In the past, China was always on the spot whenever North Korea conducted nuclear and missile provocations. "North Korea is China's problem" had long been the mainstay of the international media's way of framing the issue. Trump changed it all. By prioritizing North Korea and publically engaging in Twitter politics on the North, Trump took it onto himself. Now, North Korea has become American's problem, not China's.
This also perfectly fits with the Chinese effort to portray the North Korea's nuclear saga inherently as an issue between Washington and Pyongyang, not between Beijing and Pyongyang. In addition, China can frame North Korea's latest successful nuclear test as Trump's policy failure.
In the bigger scheme of things, China's strategic interest is not necessarily focused on the Korean Peninsula issue per se, but how to make best use of the current tension for its own geopolitical advantage, amid deepening competition and rivalry with the U.S. For China, Trump's rollercoaster with Kim or his alienation of South Korea, a key U.S. ally, is a natural boon that undermines the U.S. leadership in the region and serves China's interest. At a time like this, it's best for China to sit on the fence.
Under these circumstances, China is less prone to proactively solve the North Korean problem, but rather "manage" the situation, by calling for "calm" on all sides and asking them to refrain from engaging acts that raise regional tension.
In the mean time, China will also brush aside the international demand that it cut off its crude oil supply to North Korea, saying that's something to be discussed at the United Nations. Bringing in Russia to the arena will bolster China's position, as Xi Jinping just invited Vladimir Putin to China's southern city of Xiamen where they said they would "deal appropriately" with North Korea.
All in all, for the time being, the U.S. is likely to continue its sanctions-oriented approach on North Korea, while increasing military drills near North Korea. That will accomplish the political goal of U.S. domestic politics. While "all options are on the table," there is no better option than sanctions. China, on the other hand, will play the role of a "peacemaker" and call for "calm" on all sides, and make sure North Korea is an American problem to solve, not China's. All these then lead to one final question: What are South Korea's options?
Lee Seong-hyon, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute. Reach him at sunnybbsfs@gmail.com