Moon Jae-in's foreign policy challenge

By Lee Seong-hyon

The G20 meeting in Germany served as a good platform for President Moon to display his flair for public diplomacy. But when it came to the actual outcome, a local newspaper gave a rather harsh pronouncement: "fruitless." The categorical summary is not Moon's fault, but rather it reflects the barren international environment with reduced room for diplomacy.

Moon faces a much tougher international environment, dramatically different from a decade ago when he was a high official at the Blue House. North Korea is now a de facto nuclear state. It is even nearing mastering an ICBM technology that is expected to target the continental U.S. in a year or two. The attitudes of the U.S. and Japan are hardening against Pyongyang, many even calling for "kinetic" measures. China remains distant over the THAAD spat. The Trump-Xi chemistry is disintegrating. North Korea is not welcoming Moon's peace overture. Russia is vetoing a U.N. punitive resolution on North Korea. Japan is not in the mood for reexamining the 2015 comfort women agreement either. And, all this is happening against the backdrop of the U.S not playing its traditional role as the world's leader under the Trump administration. Already, Trump's "America first" is jeered as "America alone."

For Moon, THAAD still remains the most immediate challenge he faces. Many hoped that Moon and Xi would be able to reach a compromise during their meeting at G20. It didn't materialize. On the contrary, in front of Moon, Xi underscored China's "blood alliance" (xue meng) with North Korea. It's been quite a while for us to hear that word from a top Chinese leader, to define the Sino-North Korea relationship in such a manner. The last time was decades ago -- during the Cold War era.

Chinese analysts are already giving supreme attention to Xi's use of that particular vocabulary. What the word really means will slowly emerge in the days and weeks in the commentaries of the Chinese state mouthpiece organs as well as China's own behavior.

It is worthwhile to note that Xi didn't use the word "THAAD" to Moon, but he used the word in his separate meeting with Trump. This "omission and inclusion" is significant in two aspects. First, it means China is at least willing to engage in dialogue with Seoul over THAAD. Second, the U.S.-China relations are turning for the worse.

China calculates that the chance for South Korea to withdraw the U.S. missile system is still 50:50, and is using a combination of appeasement (dialogue) and threat (economic retaliation). China's official position remains a complete withdrawal of THAAD and nothing else.

Meanwhile, THAAD has gone beyond a military issue and taken a political symbol; China sees it as a test of its growing sphere of influence on South Korea, while the U.S. sees it as a test of the alliance's strength. It's then easy to see why the matter has become such a delicate issue among Seoul, Washington and Beijing. In principle, Seoul wants to maintain good relations with both powers. But history shows that is seldom a favored choice by dominant powers that compete with each other.

To Xi, Moon said the purpose of the THAAD environmental impact assessment (during which the full deployment of THAAD would be delayed) was to "buy time" until Seoul finds a better solution. It was the first time for South Korea's president to articulate his strategy in handling THAAD. The problem is that Moon earlier told a group of U.S. congressmen that the environmental assessment was a necessary procedure for the THAAD installation.
Moon's "strategic ambiguity" is understandable and shows the dilemma South Korea faces. But it also underestimates other countries' ability to see through it. It's important for Moon to retain credibility and stick to one narrative.

It appears that both Moon and Xi regard the G20 meetup as a "say hello" meeting and plan to hold a separate official summit this year, which marks the 25th anniversary of the two countries' establishing diplomatic relations.

Despite the THAAD issue, Moon will enhance efforts to strengthen their strategic cooperation and partnership with China. For instance, Moon sent a delegation to China's Belt & Road forum in Beijing and later threw Seoul's full weight behind China-led AIIB initiative. Moon's government is supportive of China's approach to the North Korean problem that underscores "dialogue and negotiation," a method compatible with Moon's thinking.

Lee Seong-hyon, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute. Reach him at sunnybbsfs@gmail.com

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