By Ahn Ho-young
Gen. John K. Singlaub passed away on Jan. 29 at the age of 100. For those of you who may not know him, Singlaub was a soldier of exceptional valor and commitment to his duties, who fought fascism in Europe during World War II and communism in the Korean and Vietnam wars before he retired from the U.S. Army with the rank of a Major General. Ironically, it was not so much for his valor and commitments, but the way he was sacked from the U.S. Army that made him "catapulted to the front page of the Washington Post" as a lengthy WP obituary described.
President Jimmy Carter made a campaign pledge in 1976 to bring home 32,000 U.S. ground troops stationed in Korea. Many diplomats and military officers in the U.S. had grave reservations about the pledge. Eventually, it was Singlaub who told a reporter that Carter's proposed retrenchment "will lead to war" as a previous drawdown of U.S. forces had done in 1950. Gen. Singlaub was ordered to Washington for a meeting with Carter, after which he was soon retired from the Army after 35 years of service.
He was later approached by an admirer, who told him that Singlaub could have been promoted with far more stars, had he kept quiet about Carter's plan. Gen. Singlaub is reputed to have said that if he could trade several of his stars for several millions of lives in Korea, he would do so again!
In fact, the 1970s was a time of high security concern on the Korean Peninsula. The East-West detente did not stop North Korea from strengthening its military, training special commando forces who actually came down to South Korea for a large number of attacks on civilian populations as well as the Blue House, and building underground tunnels wide enough and high enough to infiltrate division level soldiers into South Korea in a short period of time.
The animosity inculcated into North Korean troops boiled over in the form of the North's soldiers killing U.S. servicemen with axe in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom in 1976. Given such a tense security environment of the time, Gen. Singlaub's reputed statement of "trading stars for the lives of people" was more than a pompous exaggeration.
Flash forward to today, I am afraid that the security environment on and around the Korean Peninsula has not much improved since the 1970s. The end of the Cold War and euphoric expectations about lasting peace are being replaced by concerns about a new Cold War. Northeast Asia is emerging as a region of particular security concern.
In the early post-Cold War years, there was in fact a rare and hard-won chance to build meaningful peace on the Korean Peninsula. Both Koreas joined the United Nations in 1991. High-level talks held at the prime ministerial level led to the conclusion of the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges between the two Koreas in December, 1991.
In the following year, two Koreas adopted the Declaration on a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. They also set up three inter-Korean committees to implement the issues agreed upon through the Basic Agreement of the preceding year.
As a young diplomat working on politico-military issues at the Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C., I was following these developments with keen interest. I could not but be excited about the prospect of the Cold War conflicts finally coming to an end even on the Korean peninsula, North Korea coming out of its deep isolation and the two Koreas working together for peace and common prosperity.
All of these looked to be possible and within our reach in the post-Cold War world. Unfortunately, these dreams and plans came to a screeching halt when North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT in March, 1993.
That was a fatal decision at a critical fork in the road. It has taken North Korea down the road of the Arduous March, the complete failure of its economy, deeper isolation from the international community, and mounting security threats to South Korea and all of North Korea's neighbors.
North Korea's continued accumulation of nuclear materials is well documented. North Korea is showing amazing agility in developing missiles of various capabilities and distances, including KN-23s, KN-24s, and now HGVs. Entering this year alone, it conducted seven missile tests, the seventh test for an IRBM, which it suggested had already been produced in large numbers and deployed.
It is against such a background that I am concerned that the security environment has not improved since Singlaub's time. Fortunately, U.S. President Joe Biden seems to have a clear idea about how to deal with these security threats. As for the North Korean nuclear threat, he said it is to be dealt with "through diplomacy and stern deterrence." My hope is that the new Korean president will understand equally clearly the importance of deterrence, without which diplomacy does not have a chance.
Ahn Ho-young (hyahn78@mofa.or.kr) is president of the University of North Korean Studies. He served as Korean ambassador to the United States and first vice foreign minister.
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President Jimmy Carter made a campaign pledge in 1976 to bring home 32,000 U.S. ground troops stationed in Korea. Many diplomats and military officers in the U.S. had grave reservations about the pledge. Eventually, it was Singlaub who told a reporter that Carter's proposed retrenchment "will lead to war" as a previous drawdown of U.S. forces had done in 1950. Gen. Singlaub was ordered to Washington for a meeting with Carter, after which he was soon retired from the Army after 35 years of service.
He was later approached by an admirer, who told him that Singlaub could have been promoted with far more stars, had he kept quiet about Carter's plan. Gen. Singlaub is reputed to have said that if he could trade several of his stars for several millions of lives in Korea, he would do so again!
In fact, the 1970s was a time of high security concern on the Korean Peninsula. The East-West detente did not stop North Korea from strengthening its military, training special commando forces who actually came down to South Korea for a large number of attacks on civilian populations as well as the Blue House, and building underground tunnels wide enough and high enough to infiltrate division level soldiers into South Korea in a short period of time.
The animosity inculcated into North Korean troops boiled over in the form of the North's soldiers killing U.S. servicemen with axe in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom in 1976. Given such a tense security environment of the time, Gen. Singlaub's reputed statement of "trading stars for the lives of people" was more than a pompous exaggeration.
Flash forward to today, I am afraid that the security environment on and around the Korean Peninsula has not much improved since the 1970s. The end of the Cold War and euphoric expectations about lasting peace are being replaced by concerns about a new Cold War. Northeast Asia is emerging as a region of particular security concern.
In the early post-Cold War years, there was in fact a rare and hard-won chance to build meaningful peace on the Korean Peninsula. Both Koreas joined the United Nations in 1991. High-level talks held at the prime ministerial level led to the conclusion of the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges between the two Koreas in December, 1991.
In the following year, two Koreas adopted the Declaration on a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. They also set up three inter-Korean committees to implement the issues agreed upon through the Basic Agreement of the preceding year.
As a young diplomat working on politico-military issues at the Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C., I was following these developments with keen interest. I could not but be excited about the prospect of the Cold War conflicts finally coming to an end even on the Korean peninsula, North Korea coming out of its deep isolation and the two Koreas working together for peace and common prosperity.
All of these looked to be possible and within our reach in the post-Cold War world. Unfortunately, these dreams and plans came to a screeching halt when North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT in March, 1993.
That was a fatal decision at a critical fork in the road. It has taken North Korea down the road of the Arduous March, the complete failure of its economy, deeper isolation from the international community, and mounting security threats to South Korea and all of North Korea's neighbors.
North Korea's continued accumulation of nuclear materials is well documented. North Korea is showing amazing agility in developing missiles of various capabilities and distances, including KN-23s, KN-24s, and now HGVs. Entering this year alone, it conducted seven missile tests, the seventh test for an IRBM, which it suggested had already been produced in large numbers and deployed.
It is against such a background that I am concerned that the security environment has not improved since Singlaub's time. Fortunately, U.S. President Joe Biden seems to have a clear idea about how to deal with these security threats. As for the North Korean nuclear threat, he said it is to be dealt with "through diplomacy and stern deterrence." My hope is that the new Korean president will understand equally clearly the importance of deterrence, without which diplomacy does not have a chance.
Ahn Ho-young (hyahn78@mofa.or.kr) is president of the University of North Korean Studies. He served as Korean ambassador to the United States and first vice foreign minister.
