NK actions in 1968 caused anti-US protests in Seoul

Clash at Freedom Bridge, published in The Korea Times Feb. 8, 1968. / Korea Times Archive

By Matt VanVolkenburg

On Jan. 21, 1968, 31 North Korean commandos who had infiltrated Seoul were discovered less than a kilometer from Cheong Wa Dae, the now-former presidential office and residence also known as the Blue House. In the ensuing confrontation, the commandos killed police officers and threw grenades at buses, killing three passengers. During the weeks-long manhunt that followed, all of the commandos were killed except for two: one who escaped, and another, Kim Shin-jo, who was captured. Kim confessed that the goal of their mission, widely referred to as the Blue House Raid, was to kill South Korean President Park Chung-hee.

South Koreans were still recovering from this shock when, two days later, the North Korean Navy captured the USS Pueblo, an American intelligence-gathering ship, in international waters off North Korea's east coast, towed it to Wonsan harbor and imprisoned the 82 surviving crewmembers.

At an Armistice Commission meeting in Panmunjeom on Jan. 24, the North Koreans said they seized the Pueblo because "the armed espionage vessel intruded into our coastal waters in a blunt act of provocation." In response, Rear Admiral John V. Smith demanded the return of the ship and also protested the attack on the Blue House, calling it the "most heinous crime since your barbaric invasion of the Republic on June 25, 1950."

In response to the Pueblo's seizure, the U.S. moved two squadrons of F―105s into Osan Air Base and the USS Enterprise aircraft carrier to the East Sea. The fact that this was done without the South's prior knowledge, however, wounded pride already bruised by the lack of officially expressed U.S. concern regarding the attempt on Park's life, an oversight which upset Korea's president.

Park was not the only one who felt offended. On Jan. 23, when U.N. Commander Charles Bonesteel briefed South Korean Defense Minister Kim Seong-eun about the Pueblo incident, Bonesteel wrote that his counterpart "was emotionally irate" due to these differences in U.S. responses.

While some American politicians called for the recapture of the ship, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson ultimately pursued a diplomatic solution, since all other options would risk the lives of the sailors.

The North took this opportunity to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the South, by demanding that any talks take place without South Korean representatives present. Park initially accepted this, with the proviso that he be briefed on each meeting immediately after it finished. It was not popular with the public, however.

As The Korea Times put it, "such 'secret meetings' cut deep into the suspicions of the Korean people and might lead to anti-American feelings."

"Open Talks" editorial cartoon, published in The Korea Times Feb. 9, 1968. / Korea Times Archive

Park and many other South Korean civilian military leaders also expressed anger at the U.S. insistence that the South not retaliate for the Blue House Raid. During a meeting on Jan. 24, Park told U.S. Ambassador William Porter that the U.S. "seemed to be more worried about reprisals by ROK Government than…about getting satisfaction out of North Koreans." Park assured him there would be no "unilateral reprisals" by the South but made clear that retaliation would "become inevitable if there are any more attacks by the North on South Korea."

Bonesteel met with the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff on Jan. 27 and described the "strong feeling at all levels of the republic" that the U.S. "had taken no adequately drastic action" following the Blue House Raid.

"First Aid" editorial cartoon, published in The Korea Times Feb. 1, 1968. / Korea Times Archive

As well, as The Korea Times reported on Jan. 27, "the president asked the US government to carry out its promise for military and economic aid" made in 1966, rebuked the U.S. for its "sluggish fulfillment" of this pledge and suggested that the North's actions might be due to America's slow progress on this front. Within a week, the U.S. moved to transfer helicopters, howitzers, two destroyers, a squadron of F-4 fighters and other materiel to the South.

On Feb. 4, President Johnson sent a belated message to Park Chung-hee in which he showed his personal concern for Park, saying "I thank God that this unspeakable attempt [on your life] has failed." Porter told the U.S. State Department that "President Park was clearly moved" by the message. "I have not seen him affected in this way before now and he made no effort to hide his feelings as he heard President Johnson's solicitude for him and his family," he said, adding "the warm reference to him as trusted friend and ally."

Despite this moment of warm feelings, Park grew increasingly convinced that some sort of retaliatory action needed to be taken against the North, and began putting pressure on the U.S. In fact, this had begun the moment South Korean forces captured an infiltrator who "was told to say that he was after Ambassador Porter…in order to put a little more political pressure on [the U.S.] to act."

Then on Feb. 2, the defense minister "implied clearly in the National Assembly that Seoul would seriously consider withdrawing some of its troops in Vietnam" depending on how much military aid the U.S. sent. Five days later, the National Assembly grilled the cabinet and criticized the U.S.' "humiliating" diplomacy with the North and the government's "clumsy" dealings with the U.S.

After a meeting with top members of the South Korean government on Feb. 6, Bonesteel reported that they had "permitted, and probably encouraged, some turbulence in [the] Assembly and among [the] public" regarding the American stance. A day later he reported that the head of the Republic of Korea Air Force had told him privately that he feared being ordered by his president to direct airstrikes unilaterally, which Bonesteel thought sincere but also "should be read in overall context of some (South Korean government) stage-managing of incitement of ROK 'public opinion.'"

To be sure, government-approved student anti-communist rallies, complete with burning Kim Il-sung in effigy, had been held since Jan. 27. On Jan. 30, for example, 10,000 middle and high school students in Seoul held rallies and marched in the streets, while 1,500 students marched in Gangneung, Gangwon Province. These were dwarfed by a rally in Seoul the next day attended by 200,000 people. On Feb. 2, about 300 actors, singers, and dancers held a rally denouncing the communists' "barbarous acts."

Effigy of Kim Il-sung, published in The Korea Times Feb. 4, 1968. / Korea Times Archive

Soon, however, students began openly criticizing the U.S. On Feb. 6, eight student representatives demonstrated in front of the U.S. Embassy and urged the U.S. to "stop the humiliating talks with the Reds" and "take retaliatory military actions against the Communists immediately."

A day later, 300 Gideon Presbyterian College took things further when they clashed with U.S. military police while trying to cross the Freedom Bridge south of Panmunjeom, shouting slogans and carrying placards saying "We protest against the secret meetings," "Let us march to the North, which is our land," and "U.S., do not defy Korean sovereignty."

Then, on Feb. 8, 30 students held a rally at Seoul National University where they not only urged their government to immediately withdraw Korean forces from Vietnam, but also to take over operational control of South Korean military forces from the U.S.

All of this left Americans like Bonesteel and Secretary of State Dean Rusk "deeply disturbed" and worried about the "growing irrationality" in Korea, particularly that expressed by President Park. Bonesteel conceded, however, that due to American missteps and lack of openness, "we have brought [a] large part of it on ourselves." In response, it was decided to send Cyrus Vance to Korea as Johnson's personal envoy to try to calm tempers.

Traveling with Vance from the State Department was Daniel O'Donohue, who remembered that as they left for Korea, "the South Koreans were saying, 'Were not sure that we're going to accept you,'" but they were "ultimately received in an appropriate manner" upon their arrival at Gimpo Airport. Requests to speak with President Park the day they arrived were brushed off until the next day.

Over the next five days, Vance met with Park Chung-hee, Prime Minister Jeong Il-gwon, presidential secretary Lee Hu-rak and others on a number of occasions, sometimes late into the night.

U.S. envoy Cyrus Vance meets Park Chung-hee, published in The Korea Times Feb. 16, 1968. / Korea Times Archive

Upon his return to Washington, Vance reported to Johnson that things were far more disturbed in Korea than most realized.

Vance revealed that the South's defense minister, who he described as "an absolute menace," had an elite anti-infiltration unit under his command that had conducted eleven raids across the border against North Korea between October and December 1967, which in one case "took out a division headquarters" ― something high-ranking cabinet members were unaware of.

Even more dangerous was Park Chung-hee, who, Vance said, was "moody, volatile and has been drinking heavily…He has thrown ash trays at several of his assistants and I was fully prepared for that." He added that Park would "issue all sorts of orders when he begins drinking. His generals will delay any action on them until the next morning. If he says nothing about those orders the following morning then they just forget what he had told them the night before."

"Trouble Shooter" editorial cartoon, published in The Korea Times Feb. 11, 1968. / Korea Times Archive

He noted that the prime minister was a force for restraint, as were other high-ranking ministers and generals. In fact, the prime minister and the presidential secretary urged Vance to intervene on their behalf and make it clear to the president that he could not take unilateral action against the North.

Describing the public unrest in South Korea, Vance said that it was "deep and real. The people are personally offended." He added that, in regard to the Mutual Security Pact, many felt "like they have a second class arrangement" and that "their hands are tied since they are under the UN Command." Despite this, no requests to revise the treaty or for operational control were brought up. Park received a good deal of criticism for allowing discussions at Panmunjeom between the U.S. and the North to take place without South Koreans present, so Vance thought he "showed considerable courage in going along with our request to abstain from being present at those meetings."

Despite all of the hard feelings prior to Vance's visit, an agreement was drafted on U.S. military support for the South that began the modernization of the ROK Army. According to Vance, "When I left, Park put his arm around me and thanked me for coming. In terms of the basic objectives of easing tension and getting a friendly relationship re-established, the mission was a success."

Matt VanVolkenburg has a master's degree in Korean studies from the University of Washington. He is the blogger behind populargusts.blogspot.kr, and co-author of "Called by Another Name: A Memoir of the Gwangju Uprising."