 |
| Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak, right, and his South Korean counterpart Lee Jong-sup, observe a military training drill firing the Korean K9 Thunder howitzer at a training range in Torun, Poland, Feb. 23. AFP-Yonhap |
This is the second in a series of interviews with senior politicians in Korea and executives at leading think tanks in Washington over the issue of the country's provision of direct military support to Kyiv as the Ukraine war passes the one-year mark since Russia launched its attack, ending decades of relative stability in Europe. ― ED.
Seoul's reticence to offer military aid to Ukraine seen as balancing act with China, Russia
By Kim Yoo-chul
A year ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his unjustified and brutal invasion of Ukraine. The United States and its top European allies including Germany, the U.K. and Poland reacted quickly by providing a high level of security assistance to Kyiv.
South Korean defense companies have so far benefited from an explosive demand for military equipment and arms. In 2022, South Korea's arms exports reached $17.3 billion, up from $7.25 billion a year ago, according to data provided by Korea Eximbank. The Yoon Suk Yeol government aims to make South Korea become one of the world's top four arms exporters by 2027.
What is noteworthy is that the country's recent arms deal with Poland amounted to $12.4 billion, followed by a $1.7 billion deal with Egypt.
According to the agreement signed by Seoul and Warsaw, the second shipment of K2 main battle tanks and K9 self-propelled howitzers will arrive in Poland by the first half of this year.
The Polish government also purchased South Korean FA-50 jets and Chunmoo multiple-launch rocket systems. Two leading South Korean defense companies ― Hyundai Rotem and Hanwha Aerospace ― are also in talks with the Romanian government to export advanced battle tanks to the eastern European country. But representatives of the companies declined to comment citing the sensitivity of the issue.
Despite South Korea inking a series of major weapons deals with the Poland and Egypt, Seoul is still reluctant to provide lethal aid to Ukraine as current domestic laws that regulate the provision of arms to war zones make it harder to obtain approvals for direct sales or donation of weapons to Kyiv. So far, Seoul has sent several batches of non-lethal military equipment and humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
Since the beginning of Russia's invasion a year ago, Ukraine has been consistent in asking South Korea to provide lethal aid. Now, Seoul is pressured to do more to help Kyiv as Moscow's offensive pushes further into eastern Ukraine with the U.S.' major western allies struggling to provide enough light weapons.
 |
| Zack Cooper at American Enterprise Institute, left, and Sarah E. Kreps at the Brookings Institution / Korea Times file |
Speaking to The Korea Times, a former White House National Security Council (NSC) official said it is possible for Poland to re-export South Korean weapons to Ukraine if both the Korean and Polish governments agree to do so.
"Poland could, of course, re-export some equipment to Ukraine, if this is permitted by the agreement that Warsaw and Seoul signed governing the terms of the arms deal. But it is worth remembering that many of the K2 and K9 systems will not be delivered for a number of years, so the timing of these deliveries could prove somewhat problematic from that perspective," Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), who also served in the White House NSC and the Pentagon, told The Korea Times in a recent interview.
Cooper said he believes deliveries of munitions would be easier, assuming that the types of ammunition match Ukrainian needs. "But the basic arms export agreement is likely to govern those arrangements and require approval from both capitals," he responded.
The senior fellow at AEI, where he focuses on U.S. strategy in Asia, added that South Korea's strengths in managing reasonably-priced ground combat systems, including the K2 main battle tank, could potentially help Ukraine indirectly by allowing Poland to provide more equipment and parts to Kyiv in the near-term.
"But in the long term, I think South Korea should acknowledge that a country that has come under attack from an aggressor has the right to self-defense under the U.N. charter and that assistance to such countries should be looked upon favorably in the future," according to the former U.S. official.
South Korea is said to have sent U.S. 155mm howitzer shells to help Ukraine fight Russia. However, the South Korean defense ministry stressed that the U.S. would be the "end-user," without elaborating.
South Korea's pursuit of 'indirect arms sales'
Ambitious arms sales pitches by South Korean arms suppliers have not primarily targeted Ukraine as a lucrative customer, as Seoul remains wary of inciting Russia and China.
 |
| Korean K9 Thunder howitzers are seen during a military exercise at a training range in Torun, Poland, Feb. 23. AFP-Yonhap |
But countries that were reluctant to send certain military equipment are now changing their positions as the war in Ukraine, which initially started as a regional war, is becoming a generalized global conflict, according to Sarah E. Kreps, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, a Washington, D.C. think tank.
"We're in the second year of a war of attrition that will not have a quick end and more material resources are the difference between whether one country acquiesces or not. Ukraine is not a NATO country, so NATO allies have no treaty commitment to be sending military aid. It's just a matter of realpolitik driving these decisions since if Ukraine falls, then there's a non-zero probability that Putin would expand his ambitions westward," Kreps, also a professor at Cornell University's Department of Government, responded.
Certainly, there's no obligation by non-NATO allies including South Korea to materially help Ukraine. However, Kreps said she views the war has exposed a Cold War-like group of countries: ones aligned with Washington, those loyal to Moscow and ones that are unaligned.
It is in the interest of many countries that Ukraine gains the resources needed to hold off additional Russian offensives this spring, because Moscow still has military advantages and Putin's victory will create further instability in Europe and call into question the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to uphold the rules-based order. South Korea is one of the key countries backing the Biden administration's initiatives in building a rules-based regional order.
"The subtext of some of the urgings by the NATO secretary general might be that if you help us here, we'll help you there. In other words, if you help in Europe now, we'll help if the time comes where you need help in your own neighborhood. South Korea's reticence is easily explained by its geography, not only far less proximate to the region but also having to negotiate a balancing act with China and Russia," according to the fellow.
 |
| A Ukrainian serviceman sits in a tank on the frontline near Bakhmut, Ukraine, Monday, March 6. AP-Yonhap |
If South Korea is seen being too aggressive in providing support, then it risks provoking both China and Russia in ways that would be potentially harmful to South Korea's interests regarding North Korea.
"It makes sense from a 'where you sit is where you stand on the issue' perspective that NATO allies would be committing military aid and South Korea would be more hesitant. NATO countries are literally in the neighborhood of the conflict and it's very much in their national interest to commit military resources to Ukraine so Ukraine can do the fighting and absorb the losses so that these other countries do not have to," said Kreps, who is also a director of the Cornell Tech Policy Institute.
Both Cooper and Kreps said it is understandable to see South Korea's pursuit of finding "indirect ways" to help Ukraine's military with Kreps describing arms deals between Seoul and Warsaw as "one big caveat" in Seoul's reticence regarding military aid.
"In a lot of ways, major military sales seem like a matter of semantics since the end-state of arming neighbors who then arm Ukraine is the same, but again, this is all a delicate diplomatic dance in which this distinction (even if there's no real difference) seems to be operative for all parties. The risk of the military aid is that it can get into the wrong hands, be misused, stored and reused for different purposes later, etc. There are good reasons to be concerned about end use," Kreps highlighted.
South Korea's reticence regarding military aid to Ukraine, therefore, looks quite smart because "indirect" arms sales, represented by arms deals between Seoul and Warsaw, could give the government some cover. More to the point, this stance will help the South Korean government appease its public and countries like Russia and China whose wrath it hopes to keep at bay.
"South Korea is proving to be a source of rapidly and competently manufactured weapons, so the demand for its weapons will continue to increase. Even if these arms sales take place alongside contractual agreements about end-use, the recipient can also find itself having a short-term interest in actions that might be incongruent with the goals of the original exporter (South Korea). That's always a risk with arms sales," according to the Cornell professor.
"Even still, these indirect measures ― selling to countries that then sell or transfer to Ukraine ― still offer a degree of cover with respect to different audiences. South Korea is benefiting from a thriving arms industry that creates jobs and supports the nation's economy," Kreps said.
