[ANALYSIS] Korea joining IPEF may challenge peace process

By Kim Yoo-chul

President Yoon Suk-yeol's foreign policy and inter-Korean relations teams are situated to seek ways to counter China's various calculated strategies, behind their stance towards a peace process on the Korean Peninsula, following the country officially joining the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has sparked a reassessment of the challenges of the Korean Peninsula as one of the world's most dangerous geopolitical flashpoint regions.

The war has also awakened the need for China to increase its engagement with some of its allies in Southeast Asia, as well as North Korea. The nature of China's relationship with North Korea is comparable to that of the United States and South Korea. One could say that China's "linchpin" in Northeast Asia is North Korea.

Ushering in a new era of inter-Korean relations was a top priority of former President Moon Jae-in, who described himself as a mediator and facilitator crafting a bipartisan approach toward detente through exchanges of handwritten letters and several summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. These efforts even led to former U.S. President Donald Trump meeting with Kim on three occasions.

But Yoon's recent summit with U.S. President Joe Biden clearly indicated that defense, deterrence and pressure will now be sought for North Korea and other regional security issues. Because the IPEF is aimed at regrouping Washington's allies in Asia, this pact will pose a threat to China. China, the lifeline of North Korea, has been looking further to integrate itself with its allies, following Washington's imposition of sanctions on several Chinese tech companies due to security concerns.

Experts and political analysts say that the Yoon administration has fewer hedging points. However, as China is Korea's largest trading partner, further economic coordination with Beijing constitutes an available toolkit, though the Chinese government is still viewing Seoul's closeness with Washington in zero-sum terms. As China wants to maintain the status quo on the peninsula by keeping the North as a buffer zone to limit Washington's growing influence on the peninsula, if South Korea specifies its plans to strengthen its economic partnership with China, then they say North Korean nuclear issues may see some progress.

From this viewpoint, the new government doesn't need to remain super-hawkish on North Korean nuclear issues, because getting China's support matters a lot.

"How to reset Korea's position with China will be one of the top issues for Yoon's foreign policy and inter-Korean relations teams," said Kim Hyun-wook, a professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy. He added that the timing of the North's recent missile launches, hours after President Biden concluded his trip to Northeast Asia, along with the continued halt of nuclear tests, are both aimed at controlling its level of provocations, as Washington, Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo are involved in crafting the details of their North Korea policies.

This Yoon-Biden agreement has raised the possibility of the Biden administration maintaining its "low-level engagement" policy on North Korea, the core direction of which hasn't changed much from the Obama administration's "strategic patience" initiative. Economic incentives will follow only after seeing North Korea's complete denuclearization, say experts. They say it's unlikely the peninsula will see any meaningful breakthroughs in terms of advancing the level of dialogue between the interested stakeholders in the near future.

The Republic of Korea Air Force's F-15K fighters perform an elephant walk at an unidentified air base, in this photo provided by the Ministry of National Defense, May 24. AP-Yonhap

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi criticized the launch of the IPEF, saying that the strategy is "doomed to fail." Additionally, he claimed that it is aimed at creating blocs, inciting confrontation and even disrupting peace.

Questions about 'strategic clarity'

Political analysts and investors have been viewing Seoul's inclination towards Washington-led security and economic frameworks as a "tail risk." But the prime concern is, according to them, the fact that Yoon administration's "strategic clarity" position departing from the former Moon administration's "strategic ambiguity" stance on North Korean nuclear issues may cost a lot.

"North Korea doesn't want to be isolated from global attention. Korea joining the IPEF will possibly be a trigger for North Korea to test more of its advanced and other types of missile launches. Seoul needs to have balanced exposure to Beijing's geopolitical worries. The government has to acknowledge China's influence on South Korea from an economic standpoint," a top-level aide to former President Moon, who directly managed inter-Korean issues, said by telephone.

"Given the Yoon administration's security-first initiative and high-level of trade tension between the United States and China, North Korea could increase its provocative actions," said Kim Kyung-min, a professor of international politics at Hanyang University in Seoul. "But if South Korea applies a phased approach to North Korea with the implementation of some corresponding measures based on its progress, then North Korean issues could be controlled and handled effectively."

Kim added that a partial resumption of some inter-Korean economic projects could be feasible according to a "practical rapprochement" initiative.

Lee Won-deok, a professor of Japanese studies at Seoul's Kookmin University, also said that given China's significance from economic and security standpoints, as well as the shared interest of the two neighboring countries in North Korea's denuclearization, President Yoon's foreign policy and inter-Korean relations teams will have to explore strategies in ways to hedge against possible aggressive responses from China.

No more 'Three Nos' policy

Former President Moon Jae-in's engagement-oriented North Korea initiatives are now defunct. The United States and China earlier said they would support the idea of an end-of-war declaration, theoretically. However, this "unofficial agreement" will never happen under the new administration, as Yoon's foreign policy and inter-Korean relations teams won't embrace the "Three Nos" policy toward North Korea earlier sought by the Moon administration, according to an official at the presidential office.

A man watches a TV screen at a train station in Seoul showing a news program reporting about North Korea's latest missile launch with file footage of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, May 25. AP-Yonhap

"The 'Three Nos' policy isn't an official agreement or even pact. The Yoon administration is in the process of redesigning the key frameworks for issues regarding North Korea and China affairs," the official said. The Three Nos policy involved South Korea's position to have no additional deployments of the THAAD missile defense system; no expanded military alliance between Seoul, Washington and Tokyo; and no active participation in the U.S.-led missile defense system. Seoul earlier ended a military intelligence-sharing agreement with Tokyo, also known as GSOMIA.

Unlike the former administration's muted response, President Yoon has ordered his staff to explore measures to ensure Washington's "extended deterrence" commitment to the South after the North's recent ballistic missile launches.

The failed summit in Hanoi a few years ago reawakened the complexity of the North Korean nuclear issue, because all interested countries that will be affected by the progress of the North's denuclearization have their own calculations.

Getting support from Japan is also considered important for the Yoon administration, as it could help it manage North Korean issues more effectively. Japan joining the IPEF also raised expectations that the relationship between Seoul and Tokyo will recover soon. Japan is said to have given lukewarm support to a peace process on the peninsula and opposed an "incremental approach" that involves benefits such as the partial easing of sanctions, based on the level of North Korea's progress towards nuclear disarmament.